Transcendental Arguments Workshop: Vahid

In his paper, "Skepticism and Varieties of Transcendental Argument", Hamid Vahid took on a number of targets. First, he argued that transcendental arguments should be viewed as a species of inference to the best explanation (IBE). He then argued that recent 'modest' interpretations of transcendental arguments, for examples those proposed by Bob Stern, Barry Stroud and Mark Sacks, are epistemically ineffective.

First, non-modest transcendental arguments. Seeing transcendental arguments as a species of IBE means seeing them as exploiting subject matter relative assumptions which would ground the norms of simplicity, explanatory power, etc. But, if this is so, such arguments would beg the question if used to argue against, say, external world scepticism.

Second, modest transcendental arguments and the example of Bob Stern. Vahid argued that Stern's view is that transcendental arguments can be seen as justification conferring since their conclusions can be shown to enhance the coherence of the subject's belief-set. Vahid then poses a dilemma: Either coherence is truth-conducive or it is not. If it is not, then it is hard to see why the sceptic should be concerned. If it is, then the transcendental arguments become redundant, since we simply need to ask whether the proposition that appears as the consequence of the transcendental argument serves to enhance coherence - the transcendental argument itself can be bypassed.

One source of discontent with Vahid's position concerns the alignment of transcendental arguments with IBE. Take, for instance, Strawson's argument that self-ascription requires other-ascription. It is far from clear that the capacity for other ascription explains the capacity for self-ascription at all, let alone being the best explanation for it. So not all transcendental arguments can be plausibly understood in this way.

Second, with regards to the argument against Stern, can't Stern reply that the role of the transcendental argument is to identify which beliefs have a fundamental coherence enhancing role. Whilst coherence is the justificatory norm, transcendental arguments are not thereby made redundant.