Transcendental Arguments Workshop: Cassam
In his paper, "Transcendental Arguments and How-Possible Questions", Quassim Cassam argued that (1) transcendental arguments do not provide a satisfactory response to how-possible questions in epistemology, and (2) a better response to such questions is what he called a 'multi levels' response.
A how-possible question allows that a type of knowledge is actual, notices a potential obstacle to it and asks how it can be possible given that obstacle. This, in part, involves asking what the source of such knowledge is. But transcendental arguments don't ask after sources, so they can't answer such questions.
The multi-levels approach, by contrast, attempts to show: (a) By what means such knowledge is arrived at, (b) How the apparent obstacles can be overcome, (c) What the background necessary conditions are for gaining such knowledge via such means.
One question concerns whether the distinction between the aims of transcendental arguments and the multi-levels approach is really that sharp. For instance, on one reading Strawson's other minds transcendental argument tries to show that it is a necessary condition of the possibility of self-ascription that behaviour be 'criterial evidence' for mentality. This may well be taken as maintaining that a certain means of gaining knowledge is the proper conclusion of the transcendental argument in question.
Another question concerns whether it is right to say that presenting a necessary condition of P is of no use in answering a question as to how P is possible. For might we not be able to distinguish between explanatorily relevent and irrelevant necessary conditions and, whilst agreeing that the latter are of no such use, attempt to make the case that the former are not. For example, two necessary conditions of the possibility of the capacity to intelligibly ascribe contradictory predicates to one and the same subject might be (i) time-consciousness (as Mark Sacks argued in his contribution to the workshop) and (ii) that 2+2=4 (assuming this to be a necessary truth). But whilst the first is arguably explanatory of how it is possible for us to possess the capacity, the latter is obviously not.
A how-possible question allows that a type of knowledge is actual, notices a potential obstacle to it and asks how it can be possible given that obstacle. This, in part, involves asking what the source of such knowledge is. But transcendental arguments don't ask after sources, so they can't answer such questions.
The multi-levels approach, by contrast, attempts to show: (a) By what means such knowledge is arrived at, (b) How the apparent obstacles can be overcome, (c) What the background necessary conditions are for gaining such knowledge via such means.
One question concerns whether the distinction between the aims of transcendental arguments and the multi-levels approach is really that sharp. For instance, on one reading Strawson's other minds transcendental argument tries to show that it is a necessary condition of the possibility of self-ascription that behaviour be 'criterial evidence' for mentality. This may well be taken as maintaining that a certain means of gaining knowledge is the proper conclusion of the transcendental argument in question.
Another question concerns whether it is right to say that presenting a necessary condition of P is of no use in answering a question as to how P is possible. For might we not be able to distinguish between explanatorily relevent and irrelevant necessary conditions and, whilst agreeing that the latter are of no such use, attempt to make the case that the former are not. For example, two necessary conditions of the possibility of the capacity to intelligibly ascribe contradictory predicates to one and the same subject might be (i) time-consciousness (as Mark Sacks argued in his contribution to the workshop) and (ii) that 2+2=4 (assuming this to be a necessary truth). But whilst the first is arguably explanatory of how it is possible for us to possess the capacity, the latter is obviously not.
Labels: Transcendental Arguments
posted by Joel at 6:33 am
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