Reading Group: Lucy Allais, "Kant's One World"
Well I didn't get round to reading Lucy's critique of Langton, so my comments here are based purely on the "Kant's One World" (KOW) and "Kant's Idealism" (KI) papers, primarily the former. Also, I'm not going to say anything about the first half of that paper, useful and interesting as it is. Rather, I'm sticking to the positive proposal.
OK, so Lucy thinks that an account of transcendental idealism (TI) has to respect the following constraints:
1) TI has to be non-trivial
2) Ignorance of things in themselves (TTs) must be genuine ignorance
3) We must be able to have coherent thoughts about TTs
4) Appearances must be mind-dependent
5) Appearances must not be mentalised (must not be "in the mind")
6) Appearances and TTs must have a genuinely different status
As I understand it, the account sets about to achieve this in the following way:
a) First of all, we understand secondary qualities in terms of a direct realist (relational) theory of perception and, especially, a direct realist account of perceptual illusion. The idea being that we make room, within a direct realist view for the idea that a thing can appear as it is not.
b) Appearances are relational properties. That is, appearing a certain way is possessing a certain property in relation to (possible) subjects. On this view, appearances: (i) are public features of objects, (ii) represent objects as being a certain way, (iii) are mind-dependent, (iv) do not reveal the way things are in themselves.
c) The properties of objects can be specified either as they are in themselves, or via their effects on other things, including us. Ignorance of TTs amounts to the claim that we can have no knowledge of the former. That is, the ways things appear to us in experience never reveals their true, intrinsic nature (the ways they are in themselves).
About this I am puzzled by two things, both of which concern the account of appearances. The first concerns the difference between relations and powers, the second concerns the notion of representation.
First. Although in KI Lucy explicitly rejects the interpretation of appearances as powers ("my subjectivist account of colour does not see colour as a disposition of power." [KI, 483]), in KOW it seems to me that she occasionally slips into talking this way, especially when discussing Langton. For example, "The idea is that we can distinguish between specifying a property in terms of what it is a power to do, i.e. to other things, and describing it as it is in the object in itself." [KOW, 679], and "just as we cannot know the intrinsic nature of things, or the grounds of powers, we cannot know the relation between the ground and the powers" [KOW, 680].
It seems to me that there are differences between relations and powers that are relevant to the mind-dependence of appearances. As an example of a relation consider __is taller than__ and as an example of a power consider __is soluble in__. It think it is very natural to say that relations require the actual existence of their relata, whereas powers (at best) only require the possible existence of the second ___. That is, I am only taller than Jeff if Jeff exists, whereas salt is soluble in XYZ even though XYZ does not actually exist. If you don't think that this is a natural way of talking, treat it as a stipulation.
With this in mind, I want to force a choice: Are appearances relations or powers? If relations, then they are strongly mind-dependent - appearances only exist if subjects like us actually do. If powers, then they are weakly mind-dependent - appearances only exist if subjects like us possibly do.
Despite the fact that Lucy goes in for relations talk and explicitly rejects powers talk (we can put this down to a terminological difference between her and me), there is reason to think that she would choose the powers option. Why?, Well, "On the one hand, objects have colour whether we are perceiving them or not, and would not change colour if we all died; on the other hand, objects only have colour in relation to subjects like us being possibly able to perceive them." [KOW, 674]. And, although perhaps this is not inevitable, there is the sense that the relations option might slide into the view that appearances only exist when they are being perceived.
On the other hand, there is reason to think that the powers option doesn't have enough idealism in it for Lucy's tastes. In discussion Van Cleve, she says that if we, "identify the appearances of things with what the secondary qualities "in truth" are--causal powers of objects--but now our picture is in danger of losing any kind of idealism." [KI, 467]
Further, she makes the following puzzling remark, "It is not just that where there is an empirically real thing there is the possibility of experience, which a realist might also think, but that where there is no possibility of experience there is no empirically real thing." [KOW, 675]
As I understand these two, they are logically equivalent (If P then possibly Q, and If not possibly Q then P [No? What have I missed?]), so if a realist can endorse the one then he can endorse the other. But all of this sounds like the powers option: appearances require the possible existence of subjects like us.
There is more to be said on this one, but I've gone on long enough. But to my mind there is a genuine puzzle about exactly what Lucy's view is committed to.
Right. Second. About representation, Lucy says this, "Perception involves things being presented, or represented, to subjects in certain ways, and the term 'representation' could be used to mark the fact that appearances are always appearances for subjects--that appearing is essentially relational--rather than to refer to mental intermediaries." [KI, 473]
I have to admit to finding this strained. It certainly doesn't sound natural to me to think of an object's relational properties as representing the object. Especially since there is an intuitive connection between representations and things with a proposition-like structure, and it seems odd to me to think of, say, an object's colour as propositional. But lets brush that aside. The reason, as I understand it, for justifying talk of representation here is that there is error (appearances don't reveal the nature of TTs). Now I understand that thought - just like, look my beliefs can say P even though not-P, ahh belief must be representational. But it seems to me that this rationale for introducing representation talk would have the consequence that what is represented is the way the thing is, and more, the way the thing is in itself. But, if that's right then all appearances would involve illusion/misrepresentation, and this is something that Lucy wants to avoid.
So, I'm puzzled about how Lucy's view can neatly capture Kant's claim that appearances are representations. Now, I don't think that the above argument will run if we switch presentation for representation, and today Matt and Wayne went some way to convincing me that we can make this shift whilst preserving the sense of Kant's position. So perhaps this isn't such a bad thing. In any case, I have probably misunderstood some (a lot?) of what is going on here. So I'll stop.
OK, so Lucy thinks that an account of transcendental idealism (TI) has to respect the following constraints:
1) TI has to be non-trivial
2) Ignorance of things in themselves (TTs) must be genuine ignorance
3) We must be able to have coherent thoughts about TTs
4) Appearances must be mind-dependent
5) Appearances must not be mentalised (must not be "in the mind")
6) Appearances and TTs must have a genuinely different status
As I understand it, the account sets about to achieve this in the following way:
a) First of all, we understand secondary qualities in terms of a direct realist (relational) theory of perception and, especially, a direct realist account of perceptual illusion. The idea being that we make room, within a direct realist view for the idea that a thing can appear as it is not.
b) Appearances are relational properties. That is, appearing a certain way is possessing a certain property in relation to (possible) subjects. On this view, appearances: (i) are public features of objects, (ii) represent objects as being a certain way, (iii) are mind-dependent, (iv) do not reveal the way things are in themselves.
c) The properties of objects can be specified either as they are in themselves, or via their effects on other things, including us. Ignorance of TTs amounts to the claim that we can have no knowledge of the former. That is, the ways things appear to us in experience never reveals their true, intrinsic nature (the ways they are in themselves).
About this I am puzzled by two things, both of which concern the account of appearances. The first concerns the difference between relations and powers, the second concerns the notion of representation.
First. Although in KI Lucy explicitly rejects the interpretation of appearances as powers ("my subjectivist account of colour does not see colour as a disposition of power." [KI, 483]), in KOW it seems to me that she occasionally slips into talking this way, especially when discussing Langton. For example, "The idea is that we can distinguish between specifying a property in terms of what it is a power to do, i.e. to other things, and describing it as it is in the object in itself." [KOW, 679], and "just as we cannot know the intrinsic nature of things, or the grounds of powers, we cannot know the relation between the ground and the powers" [KOW, 680].
It seems to me that there are differences between relations and powers that are relevant to the mind-dependence of appearances. As an example of a relation consider __is taller than__ and as an example of a power consider __is soluble in__. It think it is very natural to say that relations require the actual existence of their relata, whereas powers (at best) only require the possible existence of the second ___. That is, I am only taller than Jeff if Jeff exists, whereas salt is soluble in XYZ even though XYZ does not actually exist. If you don't think that this is a natural way of talking, treat it as a stipulation.
With this in mind, I want to force a choice: Are appearances relations or powers? If relations, then they are strongly mind-dependent - appearances only exist if subjects like us actually do. If powers, then they are weakly mind-dependent - appearances only exist if subjects like us possibly do.
Despite the fact that Lucy goes in for relations talk and explicitly rejects powers talk (we can put this down to a terminological difference between her and me), there is reason to think that she would choose the powers option. Why?, Well, "On the one hand, objects have colour whether we are perceiving them or not, and would not change colour if we all died; on the other hand, objects only have colour in relation to subjects like us being possibly able to perceive them." [KOW, 674]. And, although perhaps this is not inevitable, there is the sense that the relations option might slide into the view that appearances only exist when they are being perceived.
On the other hand, there is reason to think that the powers option doesn't have enough idealism in it for Lucy's tastes. In discussion Van Cleve, she says that if we, "identify the appearances of things with what the secondary qualities "in truth" are--causal powers of objects--but now our picture is in danger of losing any kind of idealism." [KI, 467]
Further, she makes the following puzzling remark, "It is not just that where there is an empirically real thing there is the possibility of experience, which a realist might also think, but that where there is no possibility of experience there is no empirically real thing." [KOW, 675]
As I understand these two, they are logically equivalent (If P then possibly Q, and If not possibly Q then P [No? What have I missed?]), so if a realist can endorse the one then he can endorse the other. But all of this sounds like the powers option: appearances require the possible existence of subjects like us.
There is more to be said on this one, but I've gone on long enough. But to my mind there is a genuine puzzle about exactly what Lucy's view is committed to.
Right. Second. About representation, Lucy says this, "Perception involves things being presented, or represented, to subjects in certain ways, and the term 'representation' could be used to mark the fact that appearances are always appearances for subjects--that appearing is essentially relational--rather than to refer to mental intermediaries." [KI, 473]
I have to admit to finding this strained. It certainly doesn't sound natural to me to think of an object's relational properties as representing the object. Especially since there is an intuitive connection between representations and things with a proposition-like structure, and it seems odd to me to think of, say, an object's colour as propositional. But lets brush that aside. The reason, as I understand it, for justifying talk of representation here is that there is error (appearances don't reveal the nature of TTs). Now I understand that thought - just like, look my beliefs can say P even though not-P, ahh belief must be representational. But it seems to me that this rationale for introducing representation talk would have the consequence that what is represented is the way the thing is, and more, the way the thing is in itself. But, if that's right then all appearances would involve illusion/misrepresentation, and this is something that Lucy wants to avoid.
So, I'm puzzled about how Lucy's view can neatly capture Kant's claim that appearances are representations. Now, I don't think that the above argument will run if we switch presentation for representation, and today Matt and Wayne went some way to convincing me that we can make this shift whilst preserving the sense of Kant's position. So perhaps this isn't such a bad thing. In any case, I have probably misunderstood some (a lot?) of what is going on here. So I'll stop.
Labels: Transcendental Idealism
posted by Joel at 8:11 pm
1 Comments:
I just want to make a couple o comments about the difficulties Joel has highlighted as attaching to some of Lucy's views on Transcendental Idealism. It seems to me the difficulties arise from viewing the latter position as one in metaphysics rather than epistemology.
1, Kant uses the term 'appearance' to refer to an object of outer sense that is both presented in space and time, and conceptually determined by the intellectual synthesis of the understanding. An appearance is then the object that corresponds to the sensible affection of intuition - a presentation within the presentational order of space and time. But it is also an object that is the correlate of a judgemental act - the correlate of intellectual synthesis according to the categories.
Now, Kant uses the term 'representation' to refer to any mental item, including the unconscious flotsam and jetsam of mental life. But when he uses the term as a means of referring to appearances, he is pointing up the fact that the latter are the objects of contentful representational states of the subject. Such states result from the intellectual synthesis of what is presented by spatio-temporal intuition. So appearances are the proper objects of categorially articulated intentional states - they are not intentional objects, but the emprical objects of outer and inner sense qua determined by intellectual synthesis.
Joel pointed out that it is somewhat unnatural to think of an object representing itself as having spatio-temporal properties. Rather, the object simply has those properties - presents itself as possessing them. If we bear in mind both the role of presentation in intuition and the role of synthesis via understanding we can make sense of Kant's asserting that appearances are the way things in themselves (TiTs) present themselves, and also his talk of all appearances being representations.
But this now means TI is being driven by epistemic rather than metaphysical concerns - an appearance presents itself as spatio-temporal because it is given in the presentational order of our spatio-temporal forms of intuition, not because there is some unknown kind of relation (causal?) between the TiT and its appearance.
2, Lucy's one-worldism to some extent depends on Kant being a certain kind of realist at the transcendental level. However, I find this problematic if transcendental philosophy is supposed to be fully 'critical'. Interpreting TiTs as the inscrutable material substrate of empirical objects that constitutes their intrinsic nature seems to me to say quite alot about unkowable TiTs. For one thing it seems to say that for every empirical object there is such an intrinsic substrate. But Kant happily switches between talk of TiTS and a TiT, presumably because given his critical scruples, he wants to say nothing about the nature of the noumenal realm. So he leaves it open that some empirical objects might be a presentation of a single noumenal object.
I have to concede Kant does seem to transgress his own critical scruples when he posits the TiT as the source (causal?) of the sensible affection which characterises our form of intuition. There is no harm in positing such a source (if there is passive sensible affection, something must institute it). But there is no reason to think that the empirical object alone cannot suffice as such a source. I think Kant is somewhat beholden to traditional metaphysics in that he thinks everything conditioned by relations must be grounded in something not so conditioned. Something like this thought drives the inscrutability of matter thesis. But the thought is optional - there is nothing incoherent about holding that empirical objects determined by spatio-temporal relations are all there is, unless one subscribes to something like the principle of sufficient reason. Yet there is nothing to force one to subscribe to that principle. As transcendental philosophy is supposed to make a claim on any rational thinker who follows its arguments, it seems strange to base those arguments on optional metaphysical principles that rational people can consistently reject.
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