Transcendental Idealism Reading Group: Van Cleve's Two Worlds View
This week we read pp. 143-155 of Van Cleve's Problems from Kant. These sections aren't really a defence of the two-world view, but rather a battery of arguments against one-worldism. The arguments are of two types: those concerned with what Kant actually thought, and those concerned with which of the one and two-world views is most philosophically convincing. I shall say a little about both these types of arguments, although I won't discuss everything Van Cleve says in these sections of his book.
First, there is some textual evidence offered for why Kant is a two worlder. When he uses language indicative of one-worldism, such as using the same pronoun to refer to things as they for empirical cognition and as they are in themselves, this is a rhetorical device that does not imply one or the other of the two ontological views. Second, one worlders are in the uncomfortable position of saddling Kant with a Leibnizian conception of cognition that he clearly rejects - that we perceive things in themselves (TiTs) confusedly in perception, and clearly by means of the intellect. Presumably one-worlders are forced to pin this conception on Kant because for them, empirical cognition is of TiTs, but only in terms of how they appear, so that such cognition is a 'confused' version of what the understanding alone cognises of TiTs.
The first point is fine but points in neither a one world or two world direction, it merely makes two worldism as consistent with some of what Kant says as one-worldism. The second point seems to me to get Kant all wrong. Kant continually warns against the idea that pure understanding can think TiTs in anything more than an extremely cursory way - in a logically consistent but cognitively empty manner. This just gets us the very idea of TiTs as coherent, rather than some proper cognition of them a la Leibniz. So there are two modes of access to TiTs for one worlders. One via empirical cognition and one via transcendental philosophy itself. But (for the post-critical Kant anyway) there are not two cognitive routes to TiTS - for cognition requires an object for Kant, and the solely intellectual use of the understanding has no object.
Van Cleve goes on to raise some difficulties with apparent contradictions for the one world view. These are encountered by asserting of TiTs that they are both spatial (as they appear) and non-spatial (in themselves). He propose three different models for dissolving the contradictions, which I shal summarise as follows.
(1) It is in fact different parts of the same object that possess the apparently contradictory properties, i.e. there is no contradiction is asserting that a buliding is round on the first floor, square on the third.
(2) The apparently contradictory properties are ascribed by two different interpretations of the facts, one or both of which turn out to be false.
(3) What appear to be contradictory monadic properties are in fact relational properties. There is no contradiction is saying Fred is taller than Alfonso, yet shorter than Diego.
(1) is apparently no good as it reintroduces the two-object view. We questioned this. It doesn't so much introduce the two-object view but assert that a 'thing' has two parts, spatial and non-spatial. Now, it may be strange to talk about 'things' as composites, but it preserves the one-world view without contradiction (and who said transcendental idealism wasn't strange!).
(2) is also apparently no good, because it makes appearance talk illusory and this is something one-worlders wish to avoid. We also questioned this. Van Cleve assumes that if two apparently contradictory predicates are ascribed to a thing, then on this model the only way to make sense of this is one or both ascription being wrong. But this assumes there is a contradiction which is what the one-worlders deny. What they argue is that one ascription is true of things at the empirical level, and the other at the transcendental level. To refuse this dissolving of the contradiction by recourse to such distinctions comes very close to begging the question against the one-worlder.
(3) is the best option according to Van Cleve. If monadic properties are disguised relations, our apparent contradiciton is solved, and one-worldism can fly. He has no conclusive argument against this model. He simply points out that it is very strange to think of 'having a shape' as a relational property. But again, whoever said transcendental idealism wasn't strange!
To demystify the idea of spatial properties being relational, he suggests the relation be understood as 'being shaped in relation to subjects with constitutions like ourselves' (or some such). But then, he claims, this just reintroduces the illusion/reality picture one-worldism wants to avoid. We found this unconvincing, as it presumes transcendental realism (that there is one way of cognising objects which is common to God and ourselves, and that any object either has or does not have a given predicate correctly asserted of it according to this single cognitive perspective). Again, this seems mighty close to begging the question against one-worlders who insist that cognition is relative to a transcendental standpoint. (I presume that one-worlders think there is only one way the world is. What they deny is that that way can only be correctly described from a single cognitive perspective.)
Van Cleve raises some further problems for one-worlders. He claims that Kant, in the Amphiboly section of the first Critique, maintains that certain principles hold of TiTs - such as (a) complexes being composed of simples and (b) the identity of indiscernibles - but not of appearances. But if this is so, then one-worlders must hold that a thing in both its aspects (phenomenal and noumenal) has two different mereological structures, and that two indiscernible things are both identical (at the noumenal level) yet diverse (at the phenomenal level). Both of these conclusions Van Cleve claims are absurd.
In a footnote, Van Cleve admits that it is not clear that Kant does hold that (a) and (b) hold of TiTs, rather, Kant is merely pointing out in the Amphiboly section that our cognition cannot be understood as individuating objects solely in terms of their qualitative features via concepts. This is because spatio-temporal objects are known through their relations to other such objects, and two of them can be qualitatively identical yet differ in spatial location. Thus, Kant concludes, our cognition should not be modelled on Leibnizian style conceptual individuation. If this is right, Van Cleve's argument must be recast as 'if (a) and (b) hold of TiTs, then one-worlders are committed to the absurd conclusions outlined above.'
I personally don't find relative identity particularly troubling, as identity is a relation ('a is identical to b according to qualitative individuation, different according to spatial'). But relative mereology does seem absurd. How can a single object be both simple and composite?
First, there is some textual evidence offered for why Kant is a two worlder. When he uses language indicative of one-worldism, such as using the same pronoun to refer to things as they for empirical cognition and as they are in themselves, this is a rhetorical device that does not imply one or the other of the two ontological views. Second, one worlders are in the uncomfortable position of saddling Kant with a Leibnizian conception of cognition that he clearly rejects - that we perceive things in themselves (TiTs) confusedly in perception, and clearly by means of the intellect. Presumably one-worlders are forced to pin this conception on Kant because for them, empirical cognition is of TiTs, but only in terms of how they appear, so that such cognition is a 'confused' version of what the understanding alone cognises of TiTs.
The first point is fine but points in neither a one world or two world direction, it merely makes two worldism as consistent with some of what Kant says as one-worldism. The second point seems to me to get Kant all wrong. Kant continually warns against the idea that pure understanding can think TiTs in anything more than an extremely cursory way - in a logically consistent but cognitively empty manner. This just gets us the very idea of TiTs as coherent, rather than some proper cognition of them a la Leibniz. So there are two modes of access to TiTs for one worlders. One via empirical cognition and one via transcendental philosophy itself. But (for the post-critical Kant anyway) there are not two cognitive routes to TiTS - for cognition requires an object for Kant, and the solely intellectual use of the understanding has no object.
Van Cleve goes on to raise some difficulties with apparent contradictions for the one world view. These are encountered by asserting of TiTs that they are both spatial (as they appear) and non-spatial (in themselves). He propose three different models for dissolving the contradictions, which I shal summarise as follows.
(1) It is in fact different parts of the same object that possess the apparently contradictory properties, i.e. there is no contradiction is asserting that a buliding is round on the first floor, square on the third.
(2) The apparently contradictory properties are ascribed by two different interpretations of the facts, one or both of which turn out to be false.
(3) What appear to be contradictory monadic properties are in fact relational properties. There is no contradiction is saying Fred is taller than Alfonso, yet shorter than Diego.
(1) is apparently no good as it reintroduces the two-object view. We questioned this. It doesn't so much introduce the two-object view but assert that a 'thing' has two parts, spatial and non-spatial. Now, it may be strange to talk about 'things' as composites, but it preserves the one-world view without contradiction (and who said transcendental idealism wasn't strange!).
(2) is also apparently no good, because it makes appearance talk illusory and this is something one-worlders wish to avoid. We also questioned this. Van Cleve assumes that if two apparently contradictory predicates are ascribed to a thing, then on this model the only way to make sense of this is one or both ascription being wrong. But this assumes there is a contradiction which is what the one-worlders deny. What they argue is that one ascription is true of things at the empirical level, and the other at the transcendental level. To refuse this dissolving of the contradiction by recourse to such distinctions comes very close to begging the question against the one-worlder.
(3) is the best option according to Van Cleve. If monadic properties are disguised relations, our apparent contradiciton is solved, and one-worldism can fly. He has no conclusive argument against this model. He simply points out that it is very strange to think of 'having a shape' as a relational property. But again, whoever said transcendental idealism wasn't strange!
To demystify the idea of spatial properties being relational, he suggests the relation be understood as 'being shaped in relation to subjects with constitutions like ourselves' (or some such). But then, he claims, this just reintroduces the illusion/reality picture one-worldism wants to avoid. We found this unconvincing, as it presumes transcendental realism (that there is one way of cognising objects which is common to God and ourselves, and that any object either has or does not have a given predicate correctly asserted of it according to this single cognitive perspective). Again, this seems mighty close to begging the question against one-worlders who insist that cognition is relative to a transcendental standpoint. (I presume that one-worlders think there is only one way the world is. What they deny is that that way can only be correctly described from a single cognitive perspective.)
Van Cleve raises some further problems for one-worlders. He claims that Kant, in the Amphiboly section of the first Critique, maintains that certain principles hold of TiTs - such as (a) complexes being composed of simples and (b) the identity of indiscernibles - but not of appearances. But if this is so, then one-worlders must hold that a thing in both its aspects (phenomenal and noumenal) has two different mereological structures, and that two indiscernible things are both identical (at the noumenal level) yet diverse (at the phenomenal level). Both of these conclusions Van Cleve claims are absurd.
In a footnote, Van Cleve admits that it is not clear that Kant does hold that (a) and (b) hold of TiTs, rather, Kant is merely pointing out in the Amphiboly section that our cognition cannot be understood as individuating objects solely in terms of their qualitative features via concepts. This is because spatio-temporal objects are known through their relations to other such objects, and two of them can be qualitatively identical yet differ in spatial location. Thus, Kant concludes, our cognition should not be modelled on Leibnizian style conceptual individuation. If this is right, Van Cleve's argument must be recast as 'if (a) and (b) hold of TiTs, then one-worlders are committed to the absurd conclusions outlined above.'
I personally don't find relative identity particularly troubling, as identity is a relation ('a is identical to b according to qualitative individuation, different according to spatial'). But relative mereology does seem absurd. How can a single object be both simple and composite?
Labels: Kant, Transcendental Idealism
posted by matt at 11:32 am
1 Comments:
Matt - I think in some respects I have more sympathy with Van Cleve that you do.
For example, I don't think that Van Cleve begs the question. For I think it reasonable to say that some one-worlders do believe that there is a contradiction that needs to be resolved by introducing two levels (this is perhaps the way to read Allison), whereas others (perhaps Allais) don't believe that there is any contradiction to dissolve - merely holding that that things have both spatial and non-spatial properties. Of course, Van Cleve's argument would have no purchase on the latter position. However, it is no defence of the former position to point out that it doesn't think there is a real contradiction since it can be dissolved. For, of course, it is precisely the cogency of this 'dissolution' that Van Cleve is questioning. That is, if one wants to introduce two levels to remove the appearance of contradiction, one must explain how it is supposed to work. Van Cleve's point is that this can't be along the lines of 'true according to the times, false according to the mail'.
On another issue, I'm not sure why you find making mereological structure relative any less convincing than making identity relative. Personally I find either pretty astounding, but if we are going to allow the truth of "A=B transcendentally, and not(A=B) empirically", then what extra craziness is involved in "A is simple transcendentally, and complex empirically". Indeed, I'm tempted to say that neither are much odder than "A is non-spatial transcendentally, and spatial empirically".
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