Mind Workshop: Rödl

Sebastian Rödl, Action Explanation, took his cues from Anscombe’s contention that intentional actions attract “why?” questions without further intermediary. So what explains my intentional action (I do A because X) is simultaneously an explanation of my response to practical questions or my practical reason for endorsing that action (I should do A because X). On this picture, a peculiarity of intentional actions is, then, that action explanations explain actions that are actions in virtue of attracting this kind of explanation. Given this account of intentional action, Rödl is bound to reject the empiricist position that actions are caused by states of mind distinct from actions. In his view, practical reasons are not additional causal factors, but constitute the very causal nexus under which individual causal episodes can be subsumed and represented as a comprehensive configuration of thought, will and action. This, he concludes, makes of action concepts necessary conditions for the apprehension of intentional actions. Furthermore, as practical reasoning issues in intentional actions without further intermediary, practical reasoning presupposes the unity of thought and activity.