More Kant on NDPR

Read Cinzia Ferrini's review of Angelica Nuzzo, Kant and the Unity of Reason.

More Hegel on NDPR

Read Robert Williams' review of Robert Wallace's, Hegel's Philosophy of Readlity, Freedom and God here.

Dina Emundts at the Kant Workshop

Dina Emundts' paper 'Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics' dealt with the possibility of a scientific treatment of episodes of inner sense such as desires. She pointed out that in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant argues that science is transcendentally justified in conceiving of nature as constituted ultimately by matter. The Principles of the Understanding, according to Emundts, justify such a conception, by proving that we must presuppose an unchanging substratum of matter in order to perceive changes in empirical objects. She went on to argue that Kant seems to have no equivalent argument for the necessity of a soul substance acting as an unchanging substratum that makes possible the perception of changes in inner states. She suggested that Kant avoided such an argument precisely because he is a transcendental philosopher, i.e. precisely because he sees that the possibility of experience does not require a soul substance. She also noted however, that this left us with no possibility of making the study of inner states susceptible to treatment by the hard sciences, which means inner states are exceptions to the causal determinism that Kant’s metaphysics of nature seems to entail.

In the question period it was suggested that inner states can be studied by science in as much as they consist in intensive and extensive magnitudes, although they may not be subject to strict causal laws. It was further suggested that the fact that Kant provides no metaphysical conception of a soul substance is irrelevant to the scientific study of inner states. This is because, in actual fact, no such conception of matter as an unchanging substratum is necessary for the possibility of experiencing changes in external objects, so there is no equivalent argument needed with regard to episodes of inner sense.

Paul Abela at the Kant Workshop

Paul Abela argued in his paper ‘Knowledge, Action and the Kantian Priority of Judgement’ that Kant is a transcendental philosopher because he lays out the a priori contribution of the mind in representing Nature objectively. In doing so Kant cautions against the pitfalls of naïve empiricism. However, Abela argued that by adverting to the Axioms of Intuition and Anticipations of Perception, it can be seen that Kant is not antithetical to naturalism. This is because in these sections of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant is concerned to show how the a priori structure of judgement individuates intensive and extensive magnitudes, which are the very subject of the natural sciences.

One question that came up with relation to the foregoing was whether modern day naturalism can really be considered a form of empiricism. If not, then Kant’s criticisms of the latter leave naturalism untouched. Another related question was whether the subjectively individuated intensive/extensive magnitudes that Kant sees as the necessary objects of judgements, would have any place in a ‘hard’ naturalist reductionism.

Abela further argued that we should view the a priori demands of Kantian practical reason as compatible with our pursuit of happiness in the empirical world. He blamed the demarcation of the 20^th century moral philosophical landscape into the mutually exclusive domains of deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics, for the common misunderstanding that the issue of happiness is not relevant to Kantian moral deliberation. He argued that Kant is best seen as a moral theorist concerned with the establishment of the highest good, and that the Categorical Imperative has no meaning unless seen in the context of moral striving to actually achieve the latter.

However, it was unclear to me whether Abela was arguing that the highest good consisted in actually achieving empirical happiness, so that moral maxims be informed by the results of empirical research into what makes people happy, or that by all willing the moral law we become happy because we have achieved the highest good simply in virtue of such willing (this latter seems the more orthodox Kantian line).

Kant Workshop: Hanna

Bob Hanna's workshop paper, "Transcendental Freedom as a Natural Process", tackled the issue of Kant's theory of freedom in a novel way. Rejecting both the Timeless Agency and the Regulative Idea theories, Hanna proposed a Biological Theory which draws heavily on Kant's remarks in the Critique of Judgment. He introduced the notion of a natural causal singularity (see the paper for what he means by this!), arguing that if there are such things then both determinism and indeterminism are false. Furthermore, he suggested, Kant views biological, psychological and rational processes as natural causal singularities. This picture involves the thought that such properties are emergent, and that they are unrepeatable (as indexed to their space-time locations). Transcendental freedom involves the ability to spontaneously create such natural causal singularities - events that literally bring in to being new laws of nature.

But, so went the discussion, what account of laws is implicit in this account? For is it not natural to think of laws as things that can have more than one instance? If these 'one off' events really are metaphysically unrepeatable, why think of them as law-like rather than as something like miracles?

Further, the view requires us to think of psychological process types as individuated by the finest possible grain. But what reason do we have for doing this? Surely sorting actions into, say, kicks and punches is perfectly legitimate.

Finally, Hanna's account feeds a Kantian account of the unknowability of the causality of natural organisms etc. into dynamical systems theory, in order to get the result that psychological processes are natural causal singularities. But this raises the question as to what extent this is meant as an interpretation of Kant, or rather as a putting to use of some of his views in a more contemporary context.

Kant Workshop: Allais

Lucy Allais' workshop paper, "Kant's Transcendental Turn and the Argument for Space", contained an account of what makes the transcendental turn transcendental, a discussion of the nature of intuition, and the significance of the Transcendental Aesthetic for (hard) naturalism. I think it is probably fair to say that the aspect of the paper that attracted most attention in discussion was the claim that Kant views the a priori representation of space as delivering a non-conceptual awareness of particulars.

The main thrust was that only in such a fashion can we understand a number of Kant's remarks concerning intuition and the epistemological role it plays in cognition. The consequence for hard naturalism was that there are features of the world knowledge of which is essentially gained from the point of view of conscious experience.

A number of questions in the discussion focussed on the issue of non-conceptual content. The question seems to be in what way intuition can be said to present us with bounded, individuated objects if it has not come under some for of conceptualisation. Further, the view seems to have the consequence that we could synthesise the manifold without the categories, and that we could have consciousness without self-consciousness - both results with perhaps a rather un-Kantian ring. However, and here it matters how we define conceptual content, there was certainly some sympathy with the thought that there is some textual evidence for a view of Kant as allowing a non-conceptual awareness of particulars, and that that it would make sense of, for example, the incongruent counterparts argument.

Gardner on the Transcendental Turn

Sebastian Gardner gave a really interesting paper at Essex's departmental Seminar yesterday, entitled "The Transcendental Turn: Motivation and Execution". The paper looked at what it means to take the transcendental turn and what might motivate one to do so in the first place.

Sebastian argued that transcendental philosophy involves a turn away from naturalism (or from common sense, naturalistically conceived). The turn itself involving both a negative case against naturalism and a positive case for a transcendental position. The line of argument involved assessing upon whom the burden of proof lies. Around one hundred years ago, the position seemed that transcendental philosophy (or idealism) was the default view, and that the naturalist was the one who had to make his case. Now, the position appears to be the reverse.

Sebastian also suggested that this change of fortunes was not the result of rational argument, and that the case in naturalism's favour that accompanied the rise of analytic philosophy was inconclusive.

But, as Sebastian pointed out, we can distinguish between 'hard' (reductionist) naturalism and 'soft' (non-reductionist) naturalism, and the issues look rather different for each of these. For soft naturalists claim to accommodate the insights that might lead one to accept a transcendental view. But soft naturalism has its work cut out as, among naturalist positions, the burden of proof lies with the soft rather than the hard naturalist. As a consequence of the difficulties faced by soft naturalism, it seems that the transcendental turn is not made redundant.

Now, unfortunately, I have lost my notes and so have to rely on my patchy memory for the discussion. But some of the issues that came up were these : One of the things that might be (partly) responsible for the change in transcendental philosophy's fortunes could be the Moorean defense of common sense - conceived as a shifting of the burden of proof onto those positions which, like transcendental philosophy, appear to come into conflict with common sense. Furthermore, if this is right then it is not at all obvious that hard, rather than soft, naturalism is the default naturalist position, as soft naturalism might claim to better preserve the appearances.

Doesn't it seem likely that soft naturalism couldn't replace transcendental philosophy, as the soft naturalist will shy away from making claims about what must be the case, claims that the transcendentalist will make. Relatedly, the soft/hard distinction is conceived as a metaphysical distinction (resting on the issue of reductionism). But, one of the most natural ways of distinguishing naturalism from transcendental philosophy is epistemologically - by the view taken of a priori knowledge. So, soft naturalism would seem a very different proposition to the full transcendental position.

Finally, doesn't Kant treat the transcendental and the idealistic aspects of his position in separation? What needs motivating is the idealism, but if we think of the transcendental perspective just e from which are interested in asking about the conditions of possibility of knowledge, then it doesn't seem to require any special motivation over and above simple curiosity!

More Kant on NDPR

Angelica Nuzzo reviews George Di Giovanni, Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors: The Vocation of Humankind, 1774-1800.

Kant on NDPR

Read Steve Naragon's review of Kant's, Notes and Fragments, Guyer & Wood (ed.).