Conference: The Nature of Transcendental Philosophy
Well, our second annual conference was, I think, a great success.
We kicked off with Ulrich Schlรถsser, who claimed that Kantian transcendental philosophy is defined by its proposal that we are necessarily related to objects. His paper, "The Necessity of Object Reference, Idealism and Communicability", explored two Kantian arguments for this proposal and examined their relation to transcendental idealism.
Next, Alan Richardson outlined his view of the history of Logical Empiricism, understood via its relation to both neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy and subsequent figures such as Quine and Popper. His paper, "Has Philosophy of Science Completely lost its (Transcendental) Mind?", focused on the fate of the knowing subject in scientific philosophy, and on the tenability of 'empiricism without experience'.
In his paper, "The Bounds of Sense", Adrian Moore looked at a number of attempts from within Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy to draw a distinction between that which does and that which does not make sense. In doing so he motivated his own view that an explanation of why we should draw the bounds of sense where we do must remain ineffable.
In the final paper of the first day of the conference, Barry Stroud outlined some "Transcendental Strategies". He gave an account of what we can expect to achieve by the the use of certain distinctively transcendental ways of arguing. Although, he claimed, certain conclusions can only be reached if one assumes some form of idealism, transcendental arguments may well be of significant value in showing some propositions to be 'invulnerable' in a number ways.
Our own Matt Grist, "In Defence of Epistemic Transcendental Idealism", started off the second day of the conference by offering just what his title suggested. Distinguishing his own view from that of Henry Allison, to which it is related, Matt argued that his interpretation showed that transcendental idealism is a non-trivial 'knowledge limitation' thesis which is entailed by empirical realism, as Kant understands it.
Next, Jonathan Lear put forward an account, based on the testimonies of Crow Indians after their move to the reservation, of what it is to lose that by means of which the world is intelligible to one. In, "What is it to be Deprived of a World", he argued that an understanding of this phenomenon - loss of that which makes one's world possible - opens us up to the possibility of a distinctive kind of philosophical irony, a possibility noticed by Kierkegaard in his account of Christianity within Christendom.
In, "Transcendental Philosophy without Things in Themselves?", Wayne Martin explored the possibility of understanding both transcendental idealism and transcendental philosophy more generally, without being forced to posit the existence things in themselves - a possibility that keeps the figure of Fichte hovering in the background. He addressed the question by way of a detailed reading of Kant's treatment of freedom in Groundwork III, tentatively concluding that the resort to things in themselves is driven by a particular sort of philosophical anxiety.
Finally, Christopher Peacocke in his, "Objectivity", defended the claim that transcendental arguments can, contrary to some, establish truths about the world in a way that relies on realism rather than any form of idealism. He offered two transcendental arguments, based largely upon his account of content, designed to show a 'minimum objectivity' involved in both judgement and perceptual experience respectively.
We kicked off with Ulrich Schlรถsser, who claimed that Kantian transcendental philosophy is defined by its proposal that we are necessarily related to objects. His paper, "The Necessity of Object Reference, Idealism and Communicability", explored two Kantian arguments for this proposal and examined their relation to transcendental idealism.
Next, Alan Richardson outlined his view of the history of Logical Empiricism, understood via its relation to both neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy and subsequent figures such as Quine and Popper. His paper, "Has Philosophy of Science Completely lost its (Transcendental) Mind?", focused on the fate of the knowing subject in scientific philosophy, and on the tenability of 'empiricism without experience'.
In his paper, "The Bounds of Sense", Adrian Moore looked at a number of attempts from within Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy to draw a distinction between that which does and that which does not make sense. In doing so he motivated his own view that an explanation of why we should draw the bounds of sense where we do must remain ineffable.
In the final paper of the first day of the conference, Barry Stroud outlined some "Transcendental Strategies". He gave an account of what we can expect to achieve by the the use of certain distinctively transcendental ways of arguing. Although, he claimed, certain conclusions can only be reached if one assumes some form of idealism, transcendental arguments may well be of significant value in showing some propositions to be 'invulnerable' in a number ways.
Our own Matt Grist, "In Defence of Epistemic Transcendental Idealism", started off the second day of the conference by offering just what his title suggested. Distinguishing his own view from that of Henry Allison, to which it is related, Matt argued that his interpretation showed that transcendental idealism is a non-trivial 'knowledge limitation' thesis which is entailed by empirical realism, as Kant understands it.
Next, Jonathan Lear put forward an account, based on the testimonies of Crow Indians after their move to the reservation, of what it is to lose that by means of which the world is intelligible to one. In, "What is it to be Deprived of a World", he argued that an understanding of this phenomenon - loss of that which makes one's world possible - opens us up to the possibility of a distinctive kind of philosophical irony, a possibility noticed by Kierkegaard in his account of Christianity within Christendom.
In, "Transcendental Philosophy without Things in Themselves?", Wayne Martin explored the possibility of understanding both transcendental idealism and transcendental philosophy more generally, without being forced to posit the existence things in themselves - a possibility that keeps the figure of Fichte hovering in the background. He addressed the question by way of a detailed reading of Kant's treatment of freedom in Groundwork III, tentatively concluding that the resort to things in themselves is driven by a particular sort of philosophical anxiety.
Finally, Christopher Peacocke in his, "Objectivity", defended the claim that transcendental arguments can, contrary to some, establish truths about the world in a way that relies on realism rather than any form of idealism. He offered two transcendental arguments, based largely upon his account of content, designed to show a 'minimum objectivity' involved in both judgement and perceptual experience respectively.
posted by Joel at 12:51 pm
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