Fichte Workshop: Martin
Wayne Martin's paper at last Friday's Fichte Workshop, entitled "Transcendental Philosophy and Atheism", used the infamous Atheism Controversy as a route into the question to what extent and in what way exactly Fichte should be considered a transcendental philosopher.
Wayne articulated 'orthodox' transcendentalism in the following way: it is distinct from both transcendent metaphysics and naturalistic empirical psychology, it is concerned with our capacity for objective representations, it intends to make claims that are necessarily true, it often involves some kind of anti-sceptical ambition, and it addresses questions concerning not just our use of certain concepts but our justification in such use. Further, orthodox transcendental philosophy faces in two directions: towards the subject and towards the object. This is summed up in Kant's remark that the conditions of possibility of experience are the conditions of possibility of the objects of experience.
Wayne distinguished two senses of 'proof' in Fichte. The first, demonstration, involves the placing of concepts in the understanding for the first time. It also appears to be involved with the justification of beliefs employing those concepts. This, according to Fichte, is not the sense proper to (transcendental) philosophy. The second, properly philosophical sense, derivation or deduction, involves a "genetic explanation" based on "the system of reason as such".
But we can also distinguish in Fichte between two standpoints of inquiry: that of both common sense and science versus that of transcendental philosophy. The first considers the objects of experience, the second considers experience itself. From this identification of Fichtean transcendental philosophy with the second standpoint, Wayne drew the conclusions that (i) Fichte abandons that aspect of orthodox transcendental philosophy that is concerned with the object, focussing exclusively on the subject, (ii) There is more than just a passing resemblance between Fichte's method and that of Husserl, (iii) Strictly speaking, given the ontological neutrality of the method, Fichte should be thought of niether as a theist nor as an atheist. For such ontological claims can only be made from the standpoint of the non-philosopher.
Questions raised included the following: Wayne suggested that Fichte's writings were ambiguous concerning the role of justification. Does the sense of proof that Fichte deems appropriate to philosophy involve any claims concerning justification? But, Wayne's interpretation of Fichte as occupying the 'Husserlian' standpoint seems to answer this question in the negative. More generally one can ask how the two distinctions, between two kinds of proof on the one hand, and two kinds of standpoint on the other, are related. For it is not immediately obvious that occupying a position with regards to one necessitates occupying a position with regards to the other. As a related point, it was suggested that Fichte's apparently odd use of the phrase "causal explanation" to describe the proper philosophical method of proof can be given a transcendental reading, and that this would clear up a number of difficult issues.
Other issues concerned the account of God and the question of atheism, and also the sharp distinction that Fichte seems to draw between 'philosophy' and 'life'. With the first, it is unclear what to make of the suggestion that Fichte's philosophy should make no stand on the atheism question. For he identifies God with the moral order and belief in God as a kind of moral striving. Given this conception, it seems that the ontological neutrality espoused with regards to entities does not neatly apply. With regards to the philosophy/life distinction, it was suggested that such a sharp distinction is unwarranted especially given Fichte's apparent claim that the two standpoints are united within the person of the philosopher. The bold claim was made that philosophy is something that is done by philosophers, during the course of their lives!
Wayne articulated 'orthodox' transcendentalism in the following way: it is distinct from both transcendent metaphysics and naturalistic empirical psychology, it is concerned with our capacity for objective representations, it intends to make claims that are necessarily true, it often involves some kind of anti-sceptical ambition, and it addresses questions concerning not just our use of certain concepts but our justification in such use. Further, orthodox transcendental philosophy faces in two directions: towards the subject and towards the object. This is summed up in Kant's remark that the conditions of possibility of experience are the conditions of possibility of the objects of experience.
Wayne distinguished two senses of 'proof' in Fichte. The first, demonstration, involves the placing of concepts in the understanding for the first time. It also appears to be involved with the justification of beliefs employing those concepts. This, according to Fichte, is not the sense proper to (transcendental) philosophy. The second, properly philosophical sense, derivation or deduction, involves a "genetic explanation" based on "the system of reason as such".
But we can also distinguish in Fichte between two standpoints of inquiry: that of both common sense and science versus that of transcendental philosophy. The first considers the objects of experience, the second considers experience itself. From this identification of Fichtean transcendental philosophy with the second standpoint, Wayne drew the conclusions that (i) Fichte abandons that aspect of orthodox transcendental philosophy that is concerned with the object, focussing exclusively on the subject, (ii) There is more than just a passing resemblance between Fichte's method and that of Husserl, (iii) Strictly speaking, given the ontological neutrality of the method, Fichte should be thought of niether as a theist nor as an atheist. For such ontological claims can only be made from the standpoint of the non-philosopher.
Questions raised included the following: Wayne suggested that Fichte's writings were ambiguous concerning the role of justification. Does the sense of proof that Fichte deems appropriate to philosophy involve any claims concerning justification? But, Wayne's interpretation of Fichte as occupying the 'Husserlian' standpoint seems to answer this question in the negative. More generally one can ask how the two distinctions, between two kinds of proof on the one hand, and two kinds of standpoint on the other, are related. For it is not immediately obvious that occupying a position with regards to one necessitates occupying a position with regards to the other. As a related point, it was suggested that Fichte's apparently odd use of the phrase "causal explanation" to describe the proper philosophical method of proof can be given a transcendental reading, and that this would clear up a number of difficult issues.
Other issues concerned the account of God and the question of atheism, and also the sharp distinction that Fichte seems to draw between 'philosophy' and 'life'. With the first, it is unclear what to make of the suggestion that Fichte's philosophy should make no stand on the atheism question. For he identifies God with the moral order and belief in God as a kind of moral striving. Given this conception, it seems that the ontological neutrality espoused with regards to entities does not neatly apply. With regards to the philosophy/life distinction, it was suggested that such a sharp distinction is unwarranted especially given Fichte's apparent claim that the two standpoints are united within the person of the philosopher. The bold claim was made that philosophy is something that is done by philosophers, during the course of their lives!
posted by Joel at 10:02 am
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