Matt Grist on the Transcendental Deduction
On Thursday, TPN research fellow Matt Grist presented a paper at Essex entitled, "Reconstructing Kant's Transcendental Deduction". Matt argued that a certain line of thought presented by Kant in the transcendental deduction is defensible, but only if divorced from some of Kant's stronger and less plausible claims. The idea was that self-consciousness is/requires the capacity to self-ascribe experiences (considered as "quanta") and that such a capacity requires the subject to possess the concepts of quality and quantity.
Matt distinguished between two levels, "transcendental 1" and "transcendental 2". Transcendental 1 is the level of "ontologically independent and thus verification-transcendent properties and relations". To say something at the level of transcendental 2 "is to say something of how they [objects] must appear to us". On Matt's account, transcendental proofs must limit themselves to the level of transcendental 2 rather than transcendental 1 for, I took it, primarily Stroudian reasons. He also claimed that Kant did not always respect this distinction, making illegitimate claims (for example those about transcendental synthesis) at the level of transcendental 1.
Matt's reconsturction of the transcendental deduction was, he suggested, to be understood as taking place at the level of transcendental 2. It was, in this respect, modest. However, another problem with transcendental proofs was identified. This was that the 'us' over whom the supposed transcendental truth ranges is wider than the 'us' that constitutes the evidential base of the argument. The thought here, I believe, is that what we can currently conceive does not give us certain knowledge of transcendental truths and thus we must think of the results of transcendental proofs as merely "highly plausible".
In the discussion it became clear quite how far Matt was departing from Kant. For the transcendental 1/transcendental 2 distinction (and the modest retreat to transcendental 2) only seems to make much sense once idealism is abandoned. It was also a little unclear (to me at least) how the distinction is supposed to apply at the level of concept possession - the level at which the argument is pitched. For in what is the difference supposed to lie between possessing a concept and apparently possessing a concept? If it enables one to think the relevent (self-conscious) thoughts then this might not amount to much.
It was also wondered whether it was legitimate to begin with the thought that self-consciousness requires the self-ascription of quanta. Might there not be conceptions of self-consciousness according to which experience is unified etc. without the aid of thought? If so, then the argument might not get a grip on such subjects.
Another point was that the argument appears to rely on a particular conception of reference, such that the capacity to think of quanta requires that one be able to conceptualise them as the kind of things they are. Perhaps this conception is correct, but given Matt's general desire to remain neutral on controversial questions in the philosophy of mind/language, this might be little problematic. For it involves a rejection of causal/externalist theories of reference according to which all that is required is that the relevant causal relations be in place.
Matt distinguished between two levels, "transcendental 1" and "transcendental 2". Transcendental 1 is the level of "ontologically independent and thus verification-transcendent properties and relations". To say something at the level of transcendental 2 "is to say something of how they [objects] must appear to us". On Matt's account, transcendental proofs must limit themselves to the level of transcendental 2 rather than transcendental 1 for, I took it, primarily Stroudian reasons. He also claimed that Kant did not always respect this distinction, making illegitimate claims (for example those about transcendental synthesis) at the level of transcendental 1.
Matt's reconsturction of the transcendental deduction was, he suggested, to be understood as taking place at the level of transcendental 2. It was, in this respect, modest. However, another problem with transcendental proofs was identified. This was that the 'us' over whom the supposed transcendental truth ranges is wider than the 'us' that constitutes the evidential base of the argument. The thought here, I believe, is that what we can currently conceive does not give us certain knowledge of transcendental truths and thus we must think of the results of transcendental proofs as merely "highly plausible".
In the discussion it became clear quite how far Matt was departing from Kant. For the transcendental 1/transcendental 2 distinction (and the modest retreat to transcendental 2) only seems to make much sense once idealism is abandoned. It was also a little unclear (to me at least) how the distinction is supposed to apply at the level of concept possession - the level at which the argument is pitched. For in what is the difference supposed to lie between possessing a concept and apparently possessing a concept? If it enables one to think the relevent (self-conscious) thoughts then this might not amount to much.
It was also wondered whether it was legitimate to begin with the thought that self-consciousness requires the self-ascription of quanta. Might there not be conceptions of self-consciousness according to which experience is unified etc. without the aid of thought? If so, then the argument might not get a grip on such subjects.
Another point was that the argument appears to rely on a particular conception of reference, such that the capacity to think of quanta requires that one be able to conceptualise them as the kind of things they are. Perhaps this conception is correct, but given Matt's general desire to remain neutral on controversial questions in the philosophy of mind/language, this might be little problematic. For it involves a rejection of causal/externalist theories of reference according to which all that is required is that the relevant causal relations be in place.
posted by Joel at 3:29 pm
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