Reading Group: Huw Price, Naturalism without Representation
Price argues against a view he calls 'object naturalism', whilst defending a view he calls 'subject naturalism'. The former is the view that, "all there is is the world studied by science...all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge." (73). The latter is the view that, "Science tells us that we humans are natural creatures, and if the claims of philosophy conflict with this view, then philosophy needs to give way." (73).
As I understand it, the case against object naturalism involves the following claims:
(1) If object naturalism is to stand a chance of being well motivated, it must assume a substantial account of semantic relations, such as reference.
(2) An object naturalist needs to offer a naturalistic, that is empirical, account of the semantic relations themselves.
(3) An empirical investigation into the semantic notions must treat 'semantic irrealism' as a live empirical option - semantic irrealism being the claim that, for example, 'reference' fails to refer.
(4) It is impossible to make sense of the empirical possibility of this sort of semantic irrealism, since in asserting the irrealism one has employed the semantic notion of reference.
Price says of this argument that, "it exposes what is inevitably a nonnaturalistic presupposition in the leading contemporary conception of what is involved in taking science seriously in philosophy." (81). Interestingly, it looks rather like a sort of transcendental argument - naturalism is undermined by the fact that it must make a nonnaturalistic presupposition about reference.
He goes on to argue that his own subject naturalism fares better is it needn't assume a substantial account of reference. Thus it's countenancing the possibility that science will not force us to employ semantic notions is not the denial that 'reference' refers, but the refusal to say anything about reference.
I want to say something about (1) and (2). First (1):
(1) is the claim that object naturalism is inconsistent with a deflationary account of the semantic notions. Price suggests that this follows from the view that the 'data' for a naturalistic account in a given domain is linguistic: "we note that humans (ourselves or others) employ the term "X" in language, or the concept X, in thought. In the light of a commitment to object naturalism...we come to wonder how what these speakers are thereby talking or thinking about could be the kind of thing studied by science."(76).
Price spends some time defending this linguistic conception of the 'data' of naturalism. But I'm interested in the move from the linguistic conception to the claim that naturalism presupposes a substantial account of reference. His argument is that if a deflationary account is accepted, then there really is no difference between taking the 'data' to be linguistic practice or non-linguisitic reality. This is because, on the deflationary view, saying that the sentence, "Snow is white" is true, is just to say that snow is white.
It seems to me that this argument is only convincing if our reasons for believing in the linguistic conception of the 'data' are simultaneously reasons for disbelieving in the non-linguistic reality conception of the 'data'. But are they? I won't go into the discussion of Lewis and the Canberra Plan, but it strikes me that the point about non-cognitivism loses some of its force. Price argues that since some naturalistic views are views about linguistic practice (e.g. non-cogntivism), then they will simply be ignored if we take the 'data' to be non-linguisitic reality. But this seems wrong, if the reason for taking the data to be non-linguistic reality is a deflationary account of reference. This view wouldn't ignore non-cognitivism, it would presumably consider itself to have some reason for thinking it false, and that is a different matter.
Now (3). (3) is the claim that an object naturalist needs to offer a naturalistic, that is empirical, account of the semantic relations themselves. This seems to be something that Price takes to be too obvious to really argue for. But I wonder whether a naturalist need accept it. For, Price's definition of object naturalism includes both ontological and epistemological naturalists, let's say, physicalists and empiricists. But what reason is there to think a that a physicalist need accept (3) unless he or she is also committed to empricism?
Price says that, "Naturalism of this kind [object naturalism] seems committed to the empirical contingency of semantic relations. For any given term or sentence, it must be to some extent an empirical matter whether,and if so to what, that term refers" (81). But this doesn't seem to be an obvious conseqence of a committment to physicalism. So, it strikes me that someone who thinks that "all there is is the world studied by science", even if 'science' is read as 'physics' (note, quite a lot hangs on whether psychology counts as a science, and if so which branches it it), need think that the proper investigation of semantic notions is empirical in the above sense.
But even if one thinks that, "all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge" (73), there may still be room to reject (3). For we are owed an account of what counts as scientific knowledge. Here's a thought. A great deal of scientific knowledge is achieved via the method of inference to the best explanation. Perhaps the best explanation of certain aspects of our competence with semantic, mathematical and logical terms is that we possess some knowledge the canonical justification of which is not experiential, i.e. is apriori. Such a view will not, of course, be an empiricism. But given its reliance on inference to the best explanation, one might be tempted to accord it the status 'scientific'. Maybe, maybe not. What does seem true to me is that (2) is in need of more support that Price gives it in this paper.
As I understand it, the case against object naturalism involves the following claims:
(1) If object naturalism is to stand a chance of being well motivated, it must assume a substantial account of semantic relations, such as reference.
(2) An object naturalist needs to offer a naturalistic, that is empirical, account of the semantic relations themselves.
(3) An empirical investigation into the semantic notions must treat 'semantic irrealism' as a live empirical option - semantic irrealism being the claim that, for example, 'reference' fails to refer.
(4) It is impossible to make sense of the empirical possibility of this sort of semantic irrealism, since in asserting the irrealism one has employed the semantic notion of reference.
Price says of this argument that, "it exposes what is inevitably a nonnaturalistic presupposition in the leading contemporary conception of what is involved in taking science seriously in philosophy." (81). Interestingly, it looks rather like a sort of transcendental argument - naturalism is undermined by the fact that it must make a nonnaturalistic presupposition about reference.
He goes on to argue that his own subject naturalism fares better is it needn't assume a substantial account of reference. Thus it's countenancing the possibility that science will not force us to employ semantic notions is not the denial that 'reference' refers, but the refusal to say anything about reference.
I want to say something about (1) and (2). First (1):
(1) is the claim that object naturalism is inconsistent with a deflationary account of the semantic notions. Price suggests that this follows from the view that the 'data' for a naturalistic account in a given domain is linguistic: "we note that humans (ourselves or others) employ the term "X" in language, or the concept X, in thought. In the light of a commitment to object naturalism...we come to wonder how what these speakers are thereby talking or thinking about could be the kind of thing studied by science."(76).
Price spends some time defending this linguistic conception of the 'data' of naturalism. But I'm interested in the move from the linguistic conception to the claim that naturalism presupposes a substantial account of reference. His argument is that if a deflationary account is accepted, then there really is no difference between taking the 'data' to be linguistic practice or non-linguisitic reality. This is because, on the deflationary view, saying that the sentence, "Snow is white" is true, is just to say that snow is white.
It seems to me that this argument is only convincing if our reasons for believing in the linguistic conception of the 'data' are simultaneously reasons for disbelieving in the non-linguistic reality conception of the 'data'. But are they? I won't go into the discussion of Lewis and the Canberra Plan, but it strikes me that the point about non-cognitivism loses some of its force. Price argues that since some naturalistic views are views about linguistic practice (e.g. non-cogntivism), then they will simply be ignored if we take the 'data' to be non-linguisitic reality. But this seems wrong, if the reason for taking the data to be non-linguistic reality is a deflationary account of reference. This view wouldn't ignore non-cognitivism, it would presumably consider itself to have some reason for thinking it false, and that is a different matter.
Now (3). (3) is the claim that an object naturalist needs to offer a naturalistic, that is empirical, account of the semantic relations themselves. This seems to be something that Price takes to be too obvious to really argue for. But I wonder whether a naturalist need accept it. For, Price's definition of object naturalism includes both ontological and epistemological naturalists, let's say, physicalists and empiricists. But what reason is there to think a that a physicalist need accept (3) unless he or she is also committed to empricism?
Price says that, "Naturalism of this kind [object naturalism] seems committed to the empirical contingency of semantic relations. For any given term or sentence, it must be to some extent an empirical matter whether,and if so to what, that term refers" (81). But this doesn't seem to be an obvious conseqence of a committment to physicalism. So, it strikes me that someone who thinks that "all there is is the world studied by science", even if 'science' is read as 'physics' (note, quite a lot hangs on whether psychology counts as a science, and if so which branches it it), need think that the proper investigation of semantic notions is empirical in the above sense.
But even if one thinks that, "all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge" (73), there may still be room to reject (3). For we are owed an account of what counts as scientific knowledge. Here's a thought. A great deal of scientific knowledge is achieved via the method of inference to the best explanation. Perhaps the best explanation of certain aspects of our competence with semantic, mathematical and logical terms is that we possess some knowledge the canonical justification of which is not experiential, i.e. is apriori. Such a view will not, of course, be an empiricism. But given its reliance on inference to the best explanation, one might be tempted to accord it the status 'scientific'. Maybe, maybe not. What does seem true to me is that (2) is in need of more support that Price gives it in this paper.
posted by Joel at 9:25 pm
3 Comments:
Joel, you suggest 'inference to the best explanation' as a possible mark of theories that are to be included within the naturalistic fold. But this seems too weak a criterion. No doubt Leibniz thought his theory of pre-established harmony was based on such an inference in conjunction with other non-naturalistic premises.
To switch to a more general level, and speak in very crude terms: it seems to me that the 'naturalist' can evade all possible criticisms simply by hopping from one commitment to another of a rather nebulous web of commitments. What is pressing for me is some definitive account of what the genuine naturalistic commitments are. Then we could test them to see if they are a coherent set.
But I think this outcome unlikely for the following reason. Ontological naturalism is the idea that all there is, is what natural science studies. Methodological naturalism is the idea that there is no knowledge apart from scientific knowledge. Now, philosophical naturalists are wont to decide what the acceptable methods of scientific study are. These can range from experiments in the laboratory to the most abstract theoretical physics, perhaps even to mathematics, perhaps even to psychology. So the list is fairly open-ended (not completely open-ended, but there is plenty of room to move). Thus they can always fix the game their way: they get to decide what counts as natural scientific method and thus what gets into a naturalistic ontology. They can then expand and shrink this ontology at will. Thus whenever they get caught committing themselves to something that on their current ontological conception is a non-natural object, they always have the option of redefining what counts as scientific method, and thus what counts as a such an object. And because philosophical naturalism often appeals to the deferred promise of a far-off and presently unimaginable theory, it doesn't even have to demonstrate to any great degree how the newly admitted objects can be studied scientifically (there just has to be the promise that some presently available theory will be capable of adequate expansion in some unknown way). And this is why naturalism is such a powerful philosophical position!
"they always have the option of redefining what counts as scientific method"
That sounds pretty unfair to me - as if 'scientific method' is a term that naturalists assign a meaning to in an absolutely ad hoc way. Of course this isn't what actually happens. There's a long and fascinating history of attempts to resposibly say in what 'the scientific method' consists. Of course, the outcome may well be that there is no single such thing as the scientific method. I take it that this is Maddy's (and Dupre's) view. Supposing that this is right, there is a subtle misrepresentation in moving from, 'all knowledge is scientific knowledge' to any statement including the phrase, 'the scientific method'. Scientific methods would be open ended, true, but not because of the slippery nature of naturalists, but because of the slippery nature of science itself. But perhaps this was your point.
I certainly don't think naturalists are as a rule any more slippery than other kinds of philosophers, it's just in the nature of the position that there is lassitude in what counts as scientific method (which might be constituted by a variety of different methodologies, as a I suggested). And given the link between methodology and ontology there is always space to move into when under fire, that was my point. This makes naturalism somewhat bulletproof. Perhaps that signifies its strength. It might also be a reason for thinking it impervious to transcendental critique.
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