VRG: Maddy on Hume
The chapter on Hume (I.3) is entitled “Hume’s naturalism”. However, Maddy’s chief interest here is in Hume’s skepticism and in the connection between Hume’s skepticism and his naturalism. Her general line is that for skepticism to follow from naturalism, as is the case in (some interpretations of) Hume, this naturalism must be defective.
It is not difficult to see how this chapter connects to the previous ones. Against straightforward Cartesian skepticism, the SP maintains that an inquiry yielding reasonable beliefs can go ahead without the seal of certainty. Against extraordinary Cartesian skepticism, she maintains that an external justification of ordinary knowledge is not asked for. Humean skepticism is in line with the SP’s thinking so far. It raises cautionary rather than fundamental doubts, because it has roots in everyday empirical reasoning and does not adopt an “external” perspective on knowledge. However, Humean skepticism poses a different and more serious threat to the SP’s project. If skepticism is the “internal” consequence of an investigation based on ordinary perception and reasoning, she cannot simply undercut or ignore the skeptical challenge. In this case, the very stuff of her worldview, reasonable belief, generates doubts about rational warrants for such beliefs and thus undermines her investigation.
There are two basic ways of looking at the relation between naturalism and skepticism in Hume. Either his skepticism and his commonsense approach are distinct from each other, or his position is of one piece. The first set of accounts is less interesting. If seen as a separate issue, Hume’s skepticism can be treated more or less along the lines of the skepticism about external justification. Given the problem of an “internal” skepticism, Maddy concentrates on the single Hume for whom skepticism is a consequence of naturalism. She considers two versions of this interpretation. On the first of these (Broughton), Hume’s skepticism reflects clashes between norms of ordinary perception and reasoning. On the second of these (Stroud), Hume’s skepticism arises from his naturalistic rejection of the Cartesian ego. On the first view, there is a direct connection between Hume’s naturalism and skepticism. On the second view, this connection is indirect. It has the character of a critical appropriation, on the part of ordinary knowledge, of answers to extraordinary skepticism.
The direct connection between Hume’s naturalism and skepticism (after Broughton) can be pictured as follows. Ordinary perception and reasoning is subject to norms of clarity, consistency, carefulness, certain styles of causal argumentation and the existence of an external world. According to Hume, causal reasoning and the commitment to the existence of an external world can come apart in ordinary perception. I won’t rehearse Hume’s argument here, nor Maddy’s brief gloss on it. The familiar outcome is that ordinary reasoning can only rely on resemblance and contiguity, not cause and effect, when making connections between matters of fact. It can motivate us to attend to different ideas but falls short of reasonable beliefs. So if norms of ordinary perception and reasoning can come apart, we are left with certain habits of thought, not with stringent reasoning. This inspires cautionary skepticism.
Maddy’s SP concedes that ordinary cognitive norms can clash. Where Hume sees irrevocable confusion, however, the SP still sees potential for improvement. In her view, Hume is mistaken to conclude from the failure of some norms of ordinary perception and reasoning that they fail all at once. From the SP’s perspective, the norms of ordinary perception and reasoning are open to reassessment and refinement, much like the claims of second philosophy in general. So if there is a clash between these norms, some norms should be amended or changed. This process leaves enough ground for the SP to stand on, even if there is an incompatibility between, say, principles of causal reasoning and commonsense realism. In short, Hume’s direct “internal” skepticism can be defused by appealing to a more thoroughgoing fallibilism. According to the SP, Hume’s declaration that these clashes are irrevocable and irremediable falls short of this “spirit of open inquiry” characteristic of naturalism. So his skepticism does not follow from naturalism properly conceived, and the SP prevails.
The indirect connection between naturalism and skepticism (after Stroud) does not involve specific ordinary cognitive norms. For Hume, reasoning as such is part of the natural causal order. Hence its opposition to the detached thinking substance of Cartesian philosophy. Hume’s basic argument against the Cartesian ego is that standards of detached reasoning fail, because they do not reflect how human beings are like from an empirical perspective. If measured by the standards of detached reasoning, empirical human beliefs could never be reasonable. Clearly, the SP agrees with this critique.
But the indirect view doesn’t leave it at that. It describes Hume’s skepticism as something like an after-image of his critical engagement with the Cartesian ego. Stroud argues (in oddly dialectical fashion) that this engagement prompts the transfer into the commonsense view the traditional philosophical attitude that something is lacking from ordinary practices, turning this attitude against the traditional philosophical view. What Hume has learned from the traditional philosophical perspective, according to Stroud, is that ordinary practices can be accounted for comprehensively by distancing the account from ordinary terms. Against the detached standpoint, however, Stroud’s Hume envisages a distancing from the ordinary view that is continuous with this view. The perspective anticipated by Hume—as I understand Stroud, and I’m not sure if I get his point—is that of a sustained naturalistic investigation of human life which is a fully philosophical naturalism, a philosophical vindication, rather than a mere restatement, of ordinary perception and reasoning in the medium of that reasoning. Hume’s skepticism is an after-image of this Cartesian impulse, because Hume is kept from making sense of a comprehensive account of human nature in the medium of ordinary reasoning by his associationism. He fails to carry forward his naturalistic project, so the indirect view, because he cannot revert to a realist picture of human nature.
To the SP, the most important virtue of the indirect view is to have exposed another insufficiency in Hume’s naturalism. As before, this confirms to her that Hume’s “internal” skepticism does not follow from naturalism properly conceived and thus doesn’t present a threat to the SP’s own project. (She does not make much of Stroud’s transfer from Descartes in this context. To her, the naturalistic project of a Hume cured from his doubts would be a plain triumph over traditional philosophy.) In the concluding lines, the SP suggests how to remedy the limitations of Hume’s naturalism. An obvious course of action (already suggested by Stroud) is to fully naturalise the mental side of Hume’s views on perception and reasoning. The SP’s therapy (briefly hinted at here and presented in the second part of Maddy’s book) will replace associationism with evolutionary psychology.
Questions: Can the SP expand her fallibilism about reasonable belief to the norms of ordinary perception and reasoning without further ado? Are these norms just reasonable beliefs? Is this second order fallibilism? Either of these would be strange, or require more argument, it seems to me. Aren’t reasonable beliefs about the world revised against the background of cognitive norms as well? If new evidence forces us to revise our theory, doesn’t this involve readjusting e.g. offset explanatory models against norms of consistency rather than revising these norms?
It may be a bit unfair to make much of Maddy’s concluding gestures about evolutionary psychology. Still, given that Hume’s skepticism culminates in the claim that our reasoning is truly just a habit of association, we might wonder whether the SP’s evolutionary psychology doesn’t simply discover further habits and enshrine them as reasoning. How would this defeat skepticism?
It is not difficult to see how this chapter connects to the previous ones. Against straightforward Cartesian skepticism, the SP maintains that an inquiry yielding reasonable beliefs can go ahead without the seal of certainty. Against extraordinary Cartesian skepticism, she maintains that an external justification of ordinary knowledge is not asked for. Humean skepticism is in line with the SP’s thinking so far. It raises cautionary rather than fundamental doubts, because it has roots in everyday empirical reasoning and does not adopt an “external” perspective on knowledge. However, Humean skepticism poses a different and more serious threat to the SP’s project. If skepticism is the “internal” consequence of an investigation based on ordinary perception and reasoning, she cannot simply undercut or ignore the skeptical challenge. In this case, the very stuff of her worldview, reasonable belief, generates doubts about rational warrants for such beliefs and thus undermines her investigation.
There are two basic ways of looking at the relation between naturalism and skepticism in Hume. Either his skepticism and his commonsense approach are distinct from each other, or his position is of one piece. The first set of accounts is less interesting. If seen as a separate issue, Hume’s skepticism can be treated more or less along the lines of the skepticism about external justification. Given the problem of an “internal” skepticism, Maddy concentrates on the single Hume for whom skepticism is a consequence of naturalism. She considers two versions of this interpretation. On the first of these (Broughton), Hume’s skepticism reflects clashes between norms of ordinary perception and reasoning. On the second of these (Stroud), Hume’s skepticism arises from his naturalistic rejection of the Cartesian ego. On the first view, there is a direct connection between Hume’s naturalism and skepticism. On the second view, this connection is indirect. It has the character of a critical appropriation, on the part of ordinary knowledge, of answers to extraordinary skepticism.
The direct connection between Hume’s naturalism and skepticism (after Broughton) can be pictured as follows. Ordinary perception and reasoning is subject to norms of clarity, consistency, carefulness, certain styles of causal argumentation and the existence of an external world. According to Hume, causal reasoning and the commitment to the existence of an external world can come apart in ordinary perception. I won’t rehearse Hume’s argument here, nor Maddy’s brief gloss on it. The familiar outcome is that ordinary reasoning can only rely on resemblance and contiguity, not cause and effect, when making connections between matters of fact. It can motivate us to attend to different ideas but falls short of reasonable beliefs. So if norms of ordinary perception and reasoning can come apart, we are left with certain habits of thought, not with stringent reasoning. This inspires cautionary skepticism.
Maddy’s SP concedes that ordinary cognitive norms can clash. Where Hume sees irrevocable confusion, however, the SP still sees potential for improvement. In her view, Hume is mistaken to conclude from the failure of some norms of ordinary perception and reasoning that they fail all at once. From the SP’s perspective, the norms of ordinary perception and reasoning are open to reassessment and refinement, much like the claims of second philosophy in general. So if there is a clash between these norms, some norms should be amended or changed. This process leaves enough ground for the SP to stand on, even if there is an incompatibility between, say, principles of causal reasoning and commonsense realism. In short, Hume’s direct “internal” skepticism can be defused by appealing to a more thoroughgoing fallibilism. According to the SP, Hume’s declaration that these clashes are irrevocable and irremediable falls short of this “spirit of open inquiry” characteristic of naturalism. So his skepticism does not follow from naturalism properly conceived, and the SP prevails.
The indirect connection between naturalism and skepticism (after Stroud) does not involve specific ordinary cognitive norms. For Hume, reasoning as such is part of the natural causal order. Hence its opposition to the detached thinking substance of Cartesian philosophy. Hume’s basic argument against the Cartesian ego is that standards of detached reasoning fail, because they do not reflect how human beings are like from an empirical perspective. If measured by the standards of detached reasoning, empirical human beliefs could never be reasonable. Clearly, the SP agrees with this critique.
But the indirect view doesn’t leave it at that. It describes Hume’s skepticism as something like an after-image of his critical engagement with the Cartesian ego. Stroud argues (in oddly dialectical fashion) that this engagement prompts the transfer into the commonsense view the traditional philosophical attitude that something is lacking from ordinary practices, turning this attitude against the traditional philosophical view. What Hume has learned from the traditional philosophical perspective, according to Stroud, is that ordinary practices can be accounted for comprehensively by distancing the account from ordinary terms. Against the detached standpoint, however, Stroud’s Hume envisages a distancing from the ordinary view that is continuous with this view. The perspective anticipated by Hume—as I understand Stroud, and I’m not sure if I get his point—is that of a sustained naturalistic investigation of human life which is a fully philosophical naturalism, a philosophical vindication, rather than a mere restatement, of ordinary perception and reasoning in the medium of that reasoning. Hume’s skepticism is an after-image of this Cartesian impulse, because Hume is kept from making sense of a comprehensive account of human nature in the medium of ordinary reasoning by his associationism. He fails to carry forward his naturalistic project, so the indirect view, because he cannot revert to a realist picture of human nature.
To the SP, the most important virtue of the indirect view is to have exposed another insufficiency in Hume’s naturalism. As before, this confirms to her that Hume’s “internal” skepticism does not follow from naturalism properly conceived and thus doesn’t present a threat to the SP’s own project. (She does not make much of Stroud’s transfer from Descartes in this context. To her, the naturalistic project of a Hume cured from his doubts would be a plain triumph over traditional philosophy.) In the concluding lines, the SP suggests how to remedy the limitations of Hume’s naturalism. An obvious course of action (already suggested by Stroud) is to fully naturalise the mental side of Hume’s views on perception and reasoning. The SP’s therapy (briefly hinted at here and presented in the second part of Maddy’s book) will replace associationism with evolutionary psychology.
Questions: Can the SP expand her fallibilism about reasonable belief to the norms of ordinary perception and reasoning without further ado? Are these norms just reasonable beliefs? Is this second order fallibilism? Either of these would be strange, or require more argument, it seems to me. Aren’t reasonable beliefs about the world revised against the background of cognitive norms as well? If new evidence forces us to revise our theory, doesn’t this involve readjusting e.g. offset explanatory models against norms of consistency rather than revising these norms?
It may be a bit unfair to make much of Maddy’s concluding gestures about evolutionary psychology. Still, given that Hume’s skepticism culminates in the claim that our reasoning is truly just a habit of association, we might wonder whether the SP’s evolutionary psychology doesn’t simply discover further habits and enshrine them as reasoning. How would this defeat skepticism?
Labels: Hume, Naturalism, Scepticism
posted by Anonymous at 3:06 pm
2 Comments:
In the abstract the principle, revise our norms when they conflict, sounds as though it must be the proper naturalistic response to Hume's quandry. I guess we'll have to wait for any detail though.
Two, pretty minor, thoughts. First, I'm not sure that Maddy is explicitly committed to fallibilism about norms. She is certainly committed to the claim that they should be revised if they are found to lead to absurdidty or scepticism. But fallibilism, the view that we can know them even if we have not ruled out all possibilities of their being false, doesn't seem to be implied by anything she says. Not only does she fail to mention knowledge when it comes to norms, she doesn't even mention truth. You ask the good question, 'Are norms just reasonable beliefs?'. Well, I don't think that anything that Maddy says commits her to the view that they are beliefs at all. It is open for her to say that norms of reasoning are simply rules adopted for particular purposes, but which need not be believed. In this way she might sidestep issues of truth and (fallible) knowledge. Whether this is a coherent thing to say, I don't know.
A second thought I had concerned the interesting footnote 11. Here SP seems to do away with the problem of induction in a single paragraph. Her line, as I understand it, is to reject the general question 'How can we be justifified in believing that the future will resemble the past?', in favour of a great number of specific questions, such as 'How can we be justified in believing that the sun will (appear to) rise tomorrow?'. Her answers to these questions cite (fallible) scientific knowledge of, in this case, the solar system, etc. This raises the question, is it the case that before the discovery of the laws of planetary motion, say, people were not justified in believing that the sun would (appear to) rise tomorrow? To my mind, that seems like an unwanted consequence.
Hi Joel. Thanks for the comment and sorry for the delay.
Your first thought (cognitive norms): I seem to have jumped to conclusions there. Still, isn't it mainly down to assumptions on truth and knowledge to tell us when cognitive norms lead to absurdity and skepticism? Aren't these assumptions to guide our revision of those norms?
Your second thought (induction): Here I don't think Maddy has much of a problem. Either there are justified beliefs on the recurrence of sunrises prior to full scientific theories of them. These are formulated in terms of the SP's prejudice-free rough and ready science. I.e. you wouldn't need to understand the elliptic motion of the planets and the central position of the sun in this planetary system to justify your belief without induction. Some notion of cyclicity and some evidence in favour of it would do. Or Maddy can ignore pre-scientific views on this as she only speaks to (in her words) natives of the scientific worldview. She might even be fine with the "unwanted consequence" in that respect. Those who believe that the sun is drawn across the sky by a fiery chariot do not hold justified beliefs about why the sun would (appear to) rise tomorrow. These people didn't distinguish between astronomy and astrology either.
But I might miss a nuance here.
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