Virtual Reading Group on Transcendental Idealism: Some thoughts on Allison's 'Transcendental Idealism and Descriptive Metaphysics'

This is a summary of some of the questions and issues that came up at yesterday's TPN reading group on transcendental idealism - thanks to the other discussants for an illuminating afternoon. What I say here is my own rendition, I leave others to speak for themselves. All page references are to: Allison, Henry E., 'Transcendental Idealism and Descriptive Metaphysics' Kant Studien 60:2 (1969), pp. 216-233.

I will concentrate in this post on summarising the following aspects of the paper: Allison's conception of Kant’s transcendental idealism; Allison's criticism of Strawson’s ‘descriptive metaphysics’ as falling short of answering the quaestio juris about knowledge that Kant’s transcendental turn makes central. This will also provide a useful way of helping to clarify the following questions: What is the thesis of transcendental idealism? How does the thesis justify knowledge? What kind of justification of knowledge can we expect transcendental philosophy to provide?

Allison says Strawson holds that “…the permanent significance of the Critique lies in its “investigation of the set of ideas which forms the limiting framework of all our thought about the world and experience of the world.”” (216) Strawson identifies this investigation with an extended ‘analytical argument’ that investigates “certain general…features necessarily ingredient in any coherent conception of experience which we can form for ourselves.” (220) But Strawson wants to detach this analytical argument from the ‘disastrous model’ of transcendental idealism within which Kant (apparently) couches it. That model has the following elements:

PF1: “… the doctrine that ‘reality is supersensible and that we can have no knowledge of it.’” (217)

PF2: The necessary features of our experience of an object are imposed on nature conceived as a “pregiven matter...by some kind of mysterious transcendental activity .” (222)

PF3: The “perverted model” of primary/secondary qualities which in Kant’s hands makes all empirical features of objects come out mind-dependent, yet which renders the contrast the original model employs unintelligible by destroying any means by which such qualities can be contrasted. (217)

I shall not concern myself much here with Allison’s partial defence of Kant with respect to his possessing a ‘hygienic’ version of this model. (This defence consists in: rejecting phenomenalism as an understanding of the assertion that representations are ‘in us’; finding a way of drawing the distinction between appearances and things in themselves that is intelligible and that flows from the a priori conditions on the possibility of knowledge rather than simply being a metaphysical assumption about what the latter are). Instead, I will focus on Allison’s contention that: “Strawson draws the line in the wrong place, and that the crucial distinction is not between transcendental idealism (including the model) and the ‘analytic argument’, but between transcendental idealism, of which the so-called ‘analytic argument’ is the chief expression, and the admittedly disastrous model in terms of which Kant interpreted it.” In making this contention, Allison hopes to: “…offer a defense of transcendental idealism, of the Copernican revolution, and show that Strawson is only able to avoid this idealistic commitment at the cost of begging the very question which Kant was most concerned to answer.” (216)

Before going on to lay out in broad terms Allison’s execution of his contention and defence, it is useful to clarify (as far as is possible!) some terminology.

The ‘Copernican revolution’ (216) seems to consist in the idea that objects must conform (in some sense) to our minds. This ‘revolution’ seems motivated by the failure of metaphysics and the triumph of Humean scepticism which are of a piece in signing up to ‘transcendental realism’ ― the thesis that knowledge or cognition consists in the agreement of our conceptualisation of the world with a completely mind-independent reality. Philosophy under the auspices of the ‘revolution’ consists for Kant in ‘transcendental reflection’, which entails a ‘fundamental change in the direction of philosophical enquiry’. (217) This change in direction consists in the ‘systematic substitution of the quaestio juris for the quaestio facti’ which Allison glosses as substituting ‘a consideration of the objective validity of our judgements for an investigation of the objects known.’ (218) As we shall see, a lot will turn on what is meant by ‘objective validity’ here. Suffice it to say for now that it seems to mean a justification of our cognitive activities by demonstrating that they are articulated by concepts and principles that necessarily and correctly apply to the objects of experience. This justification is garnered through transcendental investigation into the necessary and universal characteristics of cognition.

Allison says that the ‘Copernican revolution’ is both a presupposition and a consequence of the reorientation of philosophy as transcendental reflection. There seems to be a three step procedure here; (i) adopt the Copernican stance due to the failure of traditional transcendental realism, (ii) carry out a transcendental investigation of the necessary conditions of possibility of cognition, (iii) bring out that the initial adoption of the Copernican stance is justified by adverting to the fact that step (ii) has shown that cognition can only be of objects as they are subject to a priori concepts and principles, and thus that all knowledge must consist in objects in some sense conforming to the strictures of the mind.

Allison contends that ‘transcendental idealism’ is not dependent on what Strawson describes as the disastrous model (PF1-PF3 above), but is a ‘direct outgrowth of his [Kant’s] conception of philosophy’, that is, of the three step procedure just described. The content of this idealism seems to consist in the following two claims: (a) because of the role of universal and necessary concepts and principles in cognition, objects do, in some sense, conform to the mind, and; (b) because of this the ‘traditional’ model of transcendental realism is to be rejected (that is, transcendental idealism seems to consist in the validated Copernican stance of the third step outlined above). The rejection of transcendental realism appears to be based on the following thought: if we can never come across objects not subject to various a priori concepts and principles, then the idea of cognition consisting in the agreement between representations and a completely mind-independent reality is not simply open to sceptical attack, it makes cognition itself impossible. In Allison’s words, the transcendental realist model opens up an unbridgeable ‘epistemological gap’ between mind and world. However, adopting transcendental idealism leaves “neither the notion of ‘knowledge’ nor of ‘objects’ with their pre-transcendental significance.” (218)

For the moment, keep in mind both the lack of clarity with regard to what ‘objectively valid’ means, and what exactly bridging the ‘epistemological gap’ consists in, as these questions will become important in assessing whether Allison’s critique of Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics is warranted, and if it is, to what extent.

Allison characterises the ‘essence’ of transcendental idealism further as “the tautological yet significant reflection that if an intuition is to be brought to consciousness, and thus conceived as an object, or in relation to an object, it must necessarily be subject to those conditions under which it can alone be conceptualised.” (219) This is initially quite baffling. It is hardly tautologous that being ‘brought to consciousness’ is equivalent to being ‘conceived as an object’, as this begs the question against philosophers who believe in non-conceptual content. But I think this ‘reflection’ is being made after the acceptance of the claim that there are certain a priori conceptual capacities that structure cognition (namely the categories), so that being brought to consciousness just is, according to the claim, being ‘conceived as an object’ (I am not here assessing the arguments for this claim, but trying to understand the ‘significant tautology’ it is embedded in). So the tautology seems to unpack into the following: given that there are a priori constraints on cognition, any object which is cognised will be subject to these constraints.

That this is a ‘tautology’ presumably renders it hygienic: disentangles it from the ‘disastrous model’ because adherence to it enables; 1) (contra PF1 and PF3) the ruling out of knowledge of completely mind independent things in themselves (presuming we can, from within the Copernican standpoint, legitimately refer meaningfully to the latter - but I set aside that question); 2) (contra PF2) an understanding of what it means for objects to necessarily conform to the mind without invoking the ‘imposition model’ (although there is still the question of how transcendental proofs discern necessary conditions of possibility of cognition without this model, but I leave aside that question also). That the ‘tautology’ provides hygienic versions of PF1-3 presumably makes it ‘significant’.

Allison then articulates what he takes to be Kant’s version of this ‘tautology’;

“Now, the crucial move of the Transcendental Deduction is contained in the reflection that these same concepts [the categories], ‘as a priori conditions of possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience’, (A111) and therefore possess ‘objective validity’. In saying this Kant is in effect claiming that these concepts are not only ways in which we must conceive of the world, but also the grounds of our objectively valid judgements about the world, and he can make this claim because he believes that he has shown that as ‘concepts of an object in general’, they serve to define what can alone count as an object to a finite mind.”

Everything turns on understanding some of the formulations in this passage. First, let’s start with what’s relatively clear. The phrase ‘a priori conditions of possible experience in general’ seems clear; this formulation refers to the concepts and principles that have been shown via transcendental proof to be necessary conditions of the cognition of any object (again, I leave aside the question of how ‘transcendental proof’ works, which is not at all immediately clear). But it is far from clear what the phrase that follows this one means ― the phrase ‘conditions of the possibility of objects of experience’ ― since it is asserted as equivalent to the first in some way. Working out the meaning of this ‘equivalency thesis’ is crucial, because it allows us to understand what ‘objective validity’ means. Does the equivalency consist in the ‘conditions of the possibility of objects of experience’ being the same as the ‘a priori conditions of possible experience in general’, i.e. consisting in the claim that objects of experience really are (at the empirical level) causally governed substances and so on? Or does it consist in them simply always being known as such? Allison seems to favour the latter, which is evidenced in his qualifying the claim: ‘these concepts are not only ways in which we must conceive of the world, but also the grounds of our objectively valid judgements about the world’, with the following statement; ‘he [Kant] can make this claim because he believes that he has shown that as ‘concepts of an object in general’, they serve to define what can alone count as an object to a finite mind.’

So the answer to the quaestio juris seems to be that our taking ourselves to have knowledge is justified, because the objects of which we purportedly have it necessarily conform, in their being known, to certain a priori concepts and principles. Thus we can be assured that the claims we make about the world (claims that are articulated by those concepts and principles) correctly limn that world ― that is, the claims we make at the empirical level, if all goes well, are true. But, the quaestio juris is only answered in this way, because we have adopted transcendental idealism ― we have adopted a cognitive model where true claims about the world are made true in part by the objects they are about conforming to the strictures set out by the mind (by reconceiving the object as the 'object of possible experience').

Now let’s move to Allison’s beef with Strawson (I will leave out Allison’s rebuttal of Strawson’s allegations of Kant’s phenomenalism). The questions that came up yesterday when we discussed this were: What does Strawson give us? Why does Allison not think it is enough to answer the quaestio juris? (Or, perhaps better; Why does Allison think there is some quaestio juris left to be answered once Strawson has executed his neo-transcendental project of descriptive metaphysics?)

Strawson argues for ‘looser substitutes’ (225) for Kant’s a priori concepts and principles, but still claims that knowledge of these more deflationary concepts and principles is non-empirical knowledge of what “‘understanding’ requires of a possible experience in time.” (225) So presumably the Strawsonian principles and concepts are universal and necessary features of ‘our’ conceptual scheme ― i.e. this is what being ‘invariant features’ amounts to. Let’s grant for the sake of argument that this is so and that Strawson successfully establishes the following claims:

1) That we in fact use certain concepts and principles such as some of the categories

2) That we necessarily experience the world as a unified spatio-temporal realm which displays causal regularities and thus are justified in using some of the categories that reflect this fact

3) That we can know a priori that we will use some of the categories

These claims, although involving less specific a priori claims about possible experience than Kant advances, seem to together constitute a version of the ‘equivalency thesis’ expressed by the ‘significant tautology’ cited earlier. That is, they together license the following claim; no objects that do not conform to the concepts and principles we necessarily employ can be objects of knowledge for us. But Strawson denies that accepting this claim entails accepting that we cannot have knowledge of completely mind independent objects. This amounts to accepting some form of ‘transcendental conditions’ on possible knowledge, but refusing to frame this acceptance within transcendental idealism. Allison thinks this combination is unstable, because it leaves open the ‘epistemological gap’ that Kant sought to close with his proof of the ‘objective validity’ of the categories and principles. That is, Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics can show that the latter apply necessarily, but not correctly. For if the objects of knowledge are allowed to be completely mind independent, as they are on Strawson’s model of knowledge, then the quaestio juris goes unanswered ― we may necessarily apply concepts and principles all we like, but this will not justify knowledge if we cannot show such application to yield true claims about the world.

The root of the problem as Allison identifies it is Strawson’s adherence to transcendental realism (see pp. 232-233). It is adherence to this latter epistemic/cognitive model that disallows Strawson from closing the ‘epistemological gap’ and answering the quaestio juris. Allison further criticises ‘descriptive metaphysics’ for not yielding a ‘rational justification’ of our employment of purportedly a priori concepts such as the concept of causality. (231) He argues that Strawson’s method of transcendental argument (see 229-230) can only secure the result that we necessarily employ certain concepts. Yet this is not something that a Humean would deny, agreeing that such concepts are indispensable yet are nothing more than ‘natural beliefs’ compelled in us by ‘nature’s wisdom’. As is it is a desideratum of the quaestio juris to answer Hume’s scepticism by showing the ‘objective validity’ of our employment of the concept of causality, here again Strawson’s project apparently fails to close the ‘epistemological gap’.

These last two criticisms of ‘descriptive metaphysics’ bring us nicely to a question which also came up a lot in discussion yesterday; What kind of justification of knowledge do we expect transcendental philosophy to provide? Allison demands we demonstrate the ‘objective validity’ of the central concepts and principles that articulate knowledge claims, and that this requires accepting transcendental idealism. But might we accept a weaker justification, which Strawson seems intent to give? Namely, simply show that it is necessary to conceive the world in a certain way. Once this is done, the therapeutic benefit is that various metaphysical questions dissolve. For example, if we cannot but help conceive the world in terms of substances and causes, the question of whether the world really is so composed becomes a non-question. If we must so conceive it, we will never be able to apprise ourselves of the world not being so constituted. What’s more, Allison’s criticism of Strawson for not doing any better than Hume in demonstrating the indispensability of such conceptions is unfair: Hume does not say we must employ such conceptions for a priori reasons, but rather because our nature compels us. Given different natures, we might have different compulsions. Strawson’s transcendental arguments (presuming they are successful) could be said to rule out such ‘cognitive relativism’ ― rather, any self-conscious creature like ourselves will be possessed of broadly the same conceptions of reality. And if this is so, then the conceptions are necessary and universal rather than simply indispensable and contingent. There is different kind of modal justification given by the former claim; it says we cannot but help employ our conceptions and they are not parochial. Perhaps this justification of ‘cognitive universalism’ plus the therapeutic dissolving of various metaphysical questions is all we can expect from transcendental philosophy?

One final point. On page 223-224 Allison cites Strawson’s complaint that there is no reason to see the interconnectedness amongst objects necessary for the self-ascription of experiences as holding amongst representations rather than the objects themselves. And, if only the latter kind of interconnectedness were necessary we would have no reason to employ the ‘surrogate’ of a ‘transcendental object’ which is the correlate of the synthetic unity of judgement. Allison complains (rightly in my view) that Kant is not arguing here for replacing empirical objects with intentional objects as that of which we are aware. Rather, his point is that once we see it is the unity of consciousness that requires such interconnectedness, we must understand Kant as “offering us a transcendental re-interpretation of what is meant by the real.” Allison then goes on to say that Strawson raises “the possibility that we might have an awareness of objects distinct from our representations, without any consciousness of the necessary, rule governed coherence of these representations.” This possibility would consist in there being such interconnectedness without the subject of experience being aware of it, yet that subject still enjoying awareness of objects as distinct from herself. Allison complains this would be tantamount to the idea “that we can have awareness of objects apart from the conditions under which we can alone become aware of them.” This seems significant. One of the reasons why Strawson might not see necessary conditions of experience as entailing ‘a transcendental re-interpretation of what is meant by the real’, is that he conceives of the conditions perhaps obtaining in a wholly externalist fashion. But if they must in some sense always be internal, doesn’t this rule out Strawson’s detaching transcendental idealism from transcendental arguments?