Idealism Workshop: McDaniel
In his paper, "Kantian Ignorance", Kris McDaniel argued that Kant's transcendental idealism should be understood minimally as the denial that we have knowledge of things in themselves. This position, in turn, is to be understood as the claim that we have no knowledge of the mind independent properties of objects. A mind independent property is one the instantiation of which does not entail the existence of a mind whose sensibility is receptive. The argument for transcendental idealism is, then, to be understood as resting on the claim that space, time and the (schematised) categories are mind dependent, and the claim that all properties of which we can have knowledge entail at least one of the above.
In the second part of his paper, Kris set about the task of explaining why it is that Kant's formulations often give the impression that he endorses a form of subjective idealism. Part of the explanation is that Kant uses the word "appearance" ambiguously, sometimes referring to experienced objects, sometimes to their (mind dependent) properties. This latter use goes some way towards explaining Kant's occasional apparent Berkleyianism.
Topics that came up in discussion included whether or not the view could accommodate Kant's view that we are ignorant of how the subject is in itself. For it is unclear that (Kantian) subjects have any mind-independent properties.
Second, the definitions given leave open the possibility of mind-dependent but in principle unknowable properties. But this may not sit entirely comfortably with Kant's general picture of the phenomenal world.
Finally, this minimal (and entirely negative) account of transcendental idealism has no essential place for Kant's views concerning the role of the subject in synthesising the empirical world. A related concern is that the broadness of the definition may allow too many views (e.g. global scepticism) to count as forms of transcendental idealism.
In the second part of his paper, Kris set about the task of explaining why it is that Kant's formulations often give the impression that he endorses a form of subjective idealism. Part of the explanation is that Kant uses the word "appearance" ambiguously, sometimes referring to experienced objects, sometimes to their (mind dependent) properties. This latter use goes some way towards explaining Kant's occasional apparent Berkleyianism.
Topics that came up in discussion included whether or not the view could accommodate Kant's view that we are ignorant of how the subject is in itself. For it is unclear that (Kantian) subjects have any mind-independent properties.
Second, the definitions given leave open the possibility of mind-dependent but in principle unknowable properties. But this may not sit entirely comfortably with Kant's general picture of the phenomenal world.
Finally, this minimal (and entirely negative) account of transcendental idealism has no essential place for Kant's views concerning the role of the subject in synthesising the empirical world. A related concern is that the broadness of the definition may allow too many views (e.g. global scepticism) to count as forms of transcendental idealism.
Labels: Kant, Transcendental Idealism
posted by Joel at 10:07 pm
2 Comments:
Hi folks,
Thanks for starting this up.
Here are some brief responses to the worries mentioned, which I offer in order to stimulate further discussion.
First, given how I define the notion of mind-dependence, it is not an obvious or trivial truth that every feature of a subject is mind-dependent. So there is still room for a robust claim that there are features of ourselves that we are ignorant of.
Second, I grant that my definitions leave it open that there could be some unknown and even unknowable mind-dependent features of things. I feel pretty conformatable with this consequence -- it's not clear to me that (or why) this consequence is a problem.
Third, it's true that the minimal account does allow that there are a number of positions that *entail* transcendental idealism. (Does this make these positions *forms* of transcendental idealism? I wouldn't have thought so, but whatever.) I guess I'm ok with that, but one way to avoid the problem is to build into the view some positive affirmations that we can comfortably attribute to Kant such as: some things have mind-dependent features. We can have knowledge of some of those features (in my technical sense). Some things have mind-independent features.
I think that Kant holds those views. It's not obvious to me that it is actually part of the definition of 'transcendental idealism' that these views are true. (I am ok with the minimal characterization I give.) But a cheap way to avoid the worry you mention is to build these positive assertions into the interpretation of the view. Now, e.g., Global Skepicism does not entail transcendental idealism understood in the way just mentioned.
I'm not sure how satisfied we ought to be with this move, but it's worth thinking about.
With regards to the first point, I take it that the claim that there are mind-independent features of subjects entails that subjects are not essentially minded (minded in the special way given in the definition of mind-dependence). That seems to me to amount to the idea that although I (a subject) happen to have a form of sensibility that is receptive, I could lose that form of sensibility whilst remaining myself. Aside from the question whether Kant believed such a thing(Kris - you suggested to me that he may have done), it seems a curious claim to have follow from transcendental idealism about the self.
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