Phenomenology Workshop: Dan Zahavi
Dan Zahavi's paper, "How Thin Can It Get? or What is Transcendental About Husserlian Phenomenology?" addressed the question as to whether we should consider Husserl to be a transcendental philosopher. The answer is that we should, and that this answer must be understood to encompass a number of claims: (1) Transcendental Phenomenology seeks to elucidate the phenomenon of transcendence, thereby vindicating the realism of the natural attitude; (2) It investigates the conditions of possibility of experience, meaning, manifestation and scientific inquiry; (3) Transcendental phenomenology rejects metaphysical realism - the view that there is a knowable mind independent reality (a view from nowhere).
But the picture of transcendental subjectivity that Husserl endorses is necessarily embodied and intersubjective. As such, Husserl's conception of the transcendental is modest enough in its constitutive ambitions to be taken up in a great deal of 20th Century philosophy.
The discussion was long, and a good number of issues raised. I'll mention just a few. First, the account of Husserl makes him sound a great deal closer to Heidegger (and, for that matter, Merleau-Ponty) than is sometimes thought. But this makes the dispute between those two figures somewhat mysterious. Should we think that they both misunderstood each other's work, overestimating the differences between them?
What is so 'thin' about Husserl's conception of the transcendental? Surely, if anything, placing intersubjectivity and embodiment on the side of the constituting transcendental subject makes Husserl's conception of the transcendental 'thick'?
One of the respects in which Husserl is said to be a transcendental philosopher is that he explicates the constitution of transcendence. But this sounds somewhat like a blurring of the distinction Kant made between the transcendental and the transcendent (although, of course, Kant's and Husserl's accounts of transcendence are very different).
Zahavi interprets Husserl as an externalist. But how can this be? Performing the reduction means that in order to discern what individuates intentional content one must look within experience. But that sounds like internalism, no?
Myself, I wanted slightly more as to the characterisation of metaphysical realism (that Husserl rejects) and the realism of the natural attitude (that Husserl accepts). At one point Zahavi said that it is a little misleading to call Husserl an idealist at all. Why is this so? Exactly what does Husserl's transcendental idealism amount to?
But the picture of transcendental subjectivity that Husserl endorses is necessarily embodied and intersubjective. As such, Husserl's conception of the transcendental is modest enough in its constitutive ambitions to be taken up in a great deal of 20th Century philosophy.
The discussion was long, and a good number of issues raised. I'll mention just a few. First, the account of Husserl makes him sound a great deal closer to Heidegger (and, for that matter, Merleau-Ponty) than is sometimes thought. But this makes the dispute between those two figures somewhat mysterious. Should we think that they both misunderstood each other's work, overestimating the differences between them?
What is so 'thin' about Husserl's conception of the transcendental? Surely, if anything, placing intersubjectivity and embodiment on the side of the constituting transcendental subject makes Husserl's conception of the transcendental 'thick'?
One of the respects in which Husserl is said to be a transcendental philosopher is that he explicates the constitution of transcendence. But this sounds somewhat like a blurring of the distinction Kant made between the transcendental and the transcendent (although, of course, Kant's and Husserl's accounts of transcendence are very different).
Zahavi interprets Husserl as an externalist. But how can this be? Performing the reduction means that in order to discern what individuates intentional content one must look within experience. But that sounds like internalism, no?
Myself, I wanted slightly more as to the characterisation of metaphysical realism (that Husserl rejects) and the realism of the natural attitude (that Husserl accepts). At one point Zahavi said that it is a little misleading to call Husserl an idealist at all. Why is this so? Exactly what does Husserl's transcendental idealism amount to?
posted by Joel at 2:57 pm
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home