Hegel workshop: Stern
Bob Stern gave a paper at the Hegel workshop entitled 'Naturalism or Transcendentalism in Hegel? McDowell vs Pippin'. Bob argued that McDowell's understanding of realism in ethics is not as opposed to Hegel's conception of geistlich free action as Robert Pippin has recently argued. McDowell's basic idea is that in receptivity we 'take in' real features of the world that count as ethical reasons for action. However, McDowell accepts that in order to see such features, one needs to have been lucky enough to have the 'correct' or 'proper' upbringing. And once this upbringing has done its work, a mature human has her eyes open to features of the world that are there anyway. To make an analogy; one might need to train oneself to see certain fine shades of colour. Before one undergoes the training one literally cannot see the shades in question. But even though the training is necessary, after it is complete, one simply sees what was there in the world all the while. If we are worried about it being 'spooky' that the natural world can display such anthropomorphic features as reasons for ethical action, then we need only be reminded, according to McDowell, of the narrow understanding of nature we possess. With a wider understanding of nature as second nature, we can see that it is quite 'natural' for a mature human being to have required the relevant conceptual discriminatory powers that allow for ethical judgements to be made.
Pippin complains that this McDowellian ethical realism misrepresents the self-legislating image that governs Hegel and Kant's understanding of ethics. For Pippin, the emphasis McDowell places on receptivity in ethical judging endangers the autonomy of the latter. Bob argued that once we take into account McDowell's 'Neurathian' acceptance of the role of critical self-correction in moral reasoning, we need not see McDowell's ethical realism as unfaithful to Hegel's understanding of ethics as practiced by autonomous agents.
Pippin also complains that McDowell's understanding of Hegel is not properly social in that he does not allow for the latter's understanding of the ineluctable development of Geist into societies that are constituted by mutually recognitive free rational beings. For Pippin, to safeguard against the idea that our ethical practices are parochial Hegel tells a developmental story that shows why these practices 'could not be otherwise', that is, that shows that a certain form of social mindedness is necessarily the telos of human cultures. With this transcendental grounding of ethical practices Pippin thinks his Hegel avoids accusations of ethical parochialism that McDowell's Hegel cannot. Without such a transcendental story, the latter is susceptible to scepticism over the universality of ethics that Pippin thinks Hegel was keen to rebut.
Bob argued that Pippin's worries over ethical parochialism do not hurt McDowell's Hegel. He argued that just because our ability to judge ethically is learnt within a particular cultural setting this does not of itself give us reason to view our ethical practices as parochial. Raising a distinction between real and abstract doubt, Bob argued that any real doubt about a particular ethical practice can be accommodated by McDowell's Neurathian acceptance of the importance of critical reflection over time. Furthermore, it seems that McDowell is right to give receptivity its role in grounding ethical judgements because it seems paradoxical that reason could self-legislate norms for itself out of a normative void.
One question that came up concerned whether receptivity was not being confused with immediacy; that is, just because the content of an ethical judgement is non-inferentially perceived it does not follow that we are being constrained by real features of the world that would be there anyway regardless of previous geistlich activity. Another was; How do we decide what is a real or abstract doubt over ethical parochialism without dogmatic appeal to our own ethical practices?
Pippin complains that this McDowellian ethical realism misrepresents the self-legislating image that governs Hegel and Kant's understanding of ethics. For Pippin, the emphasis McDowell places on receptivity in ethical judging endangers the autonomy of the latter. Bob argued that once we take into account McDowell's 'Neurathian' acceptance of the role of critical self-correction in moral reasoning, we need not see McDowell's ethical realism as unfaithful to Hegel's understanding of ethics as practiced by autonomous agents.
Pippin also complains that McDowell's understanding of Hegel is not properly social in that he does not allow for the latter's understanding of the ineluctable development of Geist into societies that are constituted by mutually recognitive free rational beings. For Pippin, to safeguard against the idea that our ethical practices are parochial Hegel tells a developmental story that shows why these practices 'could not be otherwise', that is, that shows that a certain form of social mindedness is necessarily the telos of human cultures. With this transcendental grounding of ethical practices Pippin thinks his Hegel avoids accusations of ethical parochialism that McDowell's Hegel cannot. Without such a transcendental story, the latter is susceptible to scepticism over the universality of ethics that Pippin thinks Hegel was keen to rebut.
Bob argued that Pippin's worries over ethical parochialism do not hurt McDowell's Hegel. He argued that just because our ability to judge ethically is learnt within a particular cultural setting this does not of itself give us reason to view our ethical practices as parochial. Raising a distinction between real and abstract doubt, Bob argued that any real doubt about a particular ethical practice can be accommodated by McDowell's Neurathian acceptance of the importance of critical reflection over time. Furthermore, it seems that McDowell is right to give receptivity its role in grounding ethical judgements because it seems paradoxical that reason could self-legislate norms for itself out of a normative void.
One question that came up concerned whether receptivity was not being confused with immediacy; that is, just because the content of an ethical judgement is non-inferentially perceived it does not follow that we are being constrained by real features of the world that would be there anyway regardless of previous geistlich activity. Another was; How do we decide what is a real or abstract doubt over ethical parochialism without dogmatic appeal to our own ethical practices?
posted by matt at 2:57 pm
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